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This paper seeks to determine the macro-economic impacts of migration of skilled medical 
personnel  from  a  receiving  country’s  perspective,  taking  the  UK  as  an  archetype  OECD 
economy that imports medical services. The resource allocation issues have been explored in 
theory, by further developing the Rybczynski theorem and empirically, using a Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model with an extended health component. The main finding is 
that  importing  foreign  doctors  and  nurses  into  the  UK  yields  higher  overall  welfare  gains 
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1. Introduction 
Health  workers  migrate  from  developing  to  developed  countries  to  better  their 
economic or social situation immediately or for the purpose of career development. 
The  incentives  to  migrate  typically  involve  a  combination  of  “push  factors” 
(unsatisfactory  working  or  living  conditions  in  the  country  of  origin)  and  “pull 
factors” (attractive working or living conditions, availability of positions and active 
recruitment  in  the  country  of  destination).
2  While  individual  motives  underlie  the 
observed migration flows – and in this sense are neither new
3 nor unique to the health 
sector as such – the so-called medical “brain drain” causes the unique problem of 
severe  workforce  shortages  in  developing  country  health  systems  that  are  already 
under  stress.
4  A  notable  difference  with  the  past  is  that  migration  and  the 
accompanying shortage of health personnel for developing countries are now usually 
permanent.
5 Faced with a dwindling work force, the task facing developing countries 
in building up their health care systems is particularly daunting. This is the more so 
for Sub-Saharan African countries which suffer the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which uses 
up most of health and medical services and claims the lives of many health workers.
6  
Recent studies suggest that the UK has a major role to play in the medical brain drain 
from  (especially  English-speaking)  Sub-Saharan  African  countries.
7  Obvious  pull 
factors  are  that  (1)  English  is  an  increasingly  international  language  and  (2)  the 
shortage of UK-trained doctors and nurses makes immediately available and qualified 
substitutes  a  financially  attractive  alternative.  This  paper  analyses  the  economic 
consequences of migration of skilled medical personnel from a receiving country’s 
perspective, taking the  UK as an archetype OECD economy that imports medical 
                                                 
2   Buchan and Dovlo (2004), Eastwood et al. (2005), Hagopian et al. (2004), Forcier et al. (2004), Ahmad (2005). Pull factors 
tend to dominate as migration is only beneficial if there are vacancies in the destination country (Stilwell et al. 2004; Bach 
2004).  The  Global  Commission  on  International  Migration  (GCIM)  groups  them  under  the  ‘3Ds’;  differences  in 
development, demography and democracy (GCIM, 2005). 
3   See Bundred and Levitt (2000), Martineau et al. (2002) and Bach (2004) for a historical perspective. 
4   Stilwell  et  al.  (2004).  Exceptions  are  countries  like  India  and  the  Philippines,  which  have  collaborative  health-worker 
migration schemes and are reported to over-produce physicians and nurses intended for an international market (Hagopian et 
al. 2004, Buchan et al. 2003, Forcier et al. 2004). 
5   In countries with better opportunities, such as India, some health workers do return (Eastwood et al. 2005). 
6   Dixon et al. (2002) for example report a HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 20% for South African nurses. 
7   Eastwood et al. (2005), Buchan and Dovlo (2004).   3 
services. The paper is part of a broader research project examining the effects of the 
medical brain drain on both receiving countries and sending countries.
8  
Economic models that have been developed so far to study the effects of increased 
worldwide labour migration are in the main Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
models and unequivocally find considerable global welfare gains.
9 These gains arise 
as  workers  flow  from  low  productivity  areas  (developing  countries)  to  high 
productivity areas (developed countries), yielding a rise in world output.
10 Most of the 
gains  are  realised  in  the  initial  phases  of  migration,  suggesting  that  even  a  small 
liberalisation of the international labour market brings about substantial welfare gains. 
Generally, while not all gains accrue to developing countries, the size of the gains 
indicates  that  liberalising  the  international  movement  of  labour  may  be  the  most 
important issue from which developing countries stand to gain (and is more important 
than, for example, global trade reform). 
In  the  latest  models  that  account  for  remittances  and  possess  a  relatively  rich 
household  welfare  analysis  the  welfare  gains  primarily  accrue  to  the  poorest 
developing regions.
11 They stand to gain especially from increased unskilled labour 
migration due to their relative abundance in this factor and due to its relatively large 
productivity  gap  between  home  and  host  countries.  In  addition,  since  temporary 
migration avoids the political costs associated with permanent migration (the threat to 
culture,  integration  problems  and  benefit  claims),  these  models  have  shifted  their 
focus  towards  liberalising  temporary  unskilled  labour  migration  flows  from 
                                                 
8   A second paper will tackle the sending countries’ perspective, whereas a third paper will provide an overview.  
9   Iregui (2003), Walmsley and Winters (2003), Winters (2003b), Winters et al. (2003) and Global Economic Prospects 2006 
(World Bank, 2005c). The first study on the impact of worldwide migration, Hamilton and Whalley (1984), is based on a 
partial equilibrium analysis and is updated by Moses and Letnes (2003, 2004). Hamilton and Whalley (1984) estimates the 
worldwide welfare gain of a full relaxation of migration controls at 100% or more of annual world income (7.82$ trillion in 
1977). Moses and Letnes’ (2003, 2004) updated version of this model finds a worldwide welfare gain of US$3.4 trillion, 
9.6% of real world GDP in 1998 and US$0.58 trillion for 1977. Iregui (2003) arrives at global welfare gains 15% to 67% of 
world GDP.  These gains fall to a level of 13% to 59% of world GDP in the presence of a segmented labour market and fall 
to a level of 3% to 11% of world GDP if only skilled labour is allowed to migrate. The analyses of Walmsley and Winters 
(2003), Winters (2003b) and Winters et al. (2003)  yield welfare gains of $156 billion a year (approximately 0.6% of world 
income in 1997) following an increase in the inward mobility of skilled and unskilled labour by only 3% of the developed 
countries’ work forces. Based on the previous analysis, the GEP 2006 obtains a global welfare gain of $356 billion (0.6% of 
global income) over the period 1970-2000. 
10   Bhatnagar (2004). 
11   Walmsley and Winters (2003), Winters (2003b), Winters et al. (2003) and GEP 2006. The latter study takes into account 
differences  in  purchasing  power  between  high-income  and  developing  countries,  which  deflates  the  welfare  gains  for 
migrants who remit less. It also distinguishes between natives, new and old migrants (the latter two being relatively close 
substitutes), with old migrants being worse off whereas natives in high-income and developing countries gain. The main 
beneficiary households are naturally the new migrant households who are earning a higher wage abroad.   4 
developing  to  developed  countries.  According  to  these  studies,  the  only  challenge 
posed by the temporary movement of natural persons governed by GATS Mode 4 is 
to ensure that local unskilled workers in developed countries are not worse off by the 
inflow of migrant workers, which can be done via some form of compensation in the 
short run and education/training or improved asset distribution in the long run. 
As previously noted, a far greater challenge is that the migration of skilled workers 
entails a (permanent) loss of scarce human capital to the developing country of origin, 
i.e. a brain drain.
12 So, while economic models suggest that the migration of unskilled 
workers leads to welfare gains worldwide, and for both developing and high-income 
regions, the impact of liberalising the movement of skilled workers on global welfare 
is a lot less clear. The research project addresses this caveat, by modelling in greater 
detail the migration of skilled health workers, i.e. the “medical brain drain”, from 
developing countries to developed countries. The focus on medical migration also 
allows us to analyse the associated adverse health consequences for many developing 
countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, that already suffer from severe medical 
workforce  shortages  and,  their  mirror  image,  the  associated  positive  health 
consequences for developed countries, such as the UK, whose health care systems are 
rationed by limited public funding.  
In the analysis we employ a static CGE model for the UK, calibrated to a purpose-
built Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the year 2000 with considerable refinement 
in terms of sectors (distinguishing health care and its main input suppliers), factors 
(capital, skilled and unskilled labour) and household types (based on age and labour 
market participation of household members). It is the first of its kind in that it has 
been  designed  to  analyse  the  macro-economic  impacts  of  changes  in  health  care 
provision, whilst recognising the simultaneous effects of consequent changes in health 
on effective labour supplies and the resource claims made by the health care sector. 
The effects on welfare of higher health provision come through two main channels: 
(a) the direct gain from increasing the “well-being” of the population, and (b) the 
                                                 
12   With respect to potential gains in human capital (for example upon return, or those generated by a rise in the expected return 
on education for those staying behind) Schiff (2005) shows that claims about the size and impact of the brain gain stemming 
from the increased expected return on education in the country of origin on welfare and growth are greatly exaggerated and 
that brain drain is likely to just entail a loss for developing source countries. See also the World Bank (2005b, p. 208-210).   5 
indirect  effects  of  an  increase  in  the  size  of  the  effective  (i.e.  “able  to  work”) 
endowments of skilled and unskilled labour for use in non-health activities.
13 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents what is known 
about migration flows of health workers into the UK and their remittance behaviour, 
using a variety of sources. We focus in particular on doctors and nurses, the two 
health worker types crucial for the delivery of health care, and contrast the evidence 
with  that  available  for  the  largest  economy  in  the  world,  and  the  key  driver  of 
worldwide migration, the USA. Section 3 gives an overview of UK and international 
policies  on  migration  and  their  influence  observed  and  possible  future  migration 
flows. Section 4 presents some theory on the economic impacts of medical migration 
from a receiving country’s perspective. The approach is based on that commonly used 
in the explanation of ‘Rybczynski effects’ in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, 
but now following changes in factor endowments which are endogenously determined 
by government provision of health care. The section presents the effects on sectoral 
outputs and welfare in the long-term, where the health sector expansion is driven by 
an increase in the use of domestic skilled and unskilled labour, and in the short-term, 
where  skilled  workers  in  the  health  sector  have  health-specific  skills  so  that  an 
increase in health output is driven either by an increase in the use of unskilled labour 
only, or also by imports of foreign medical skilled workers. Section 5 discusses the 
model simulations and results. Specifically, the policies of a generic increase in the 
National Health Service (NHS) budget and the immigration of foreign doctors and 
nurses at the current wage, whilst varying the share of remittances in migrant income, 
are contrasted with one another. We assume that doctors and nurses are immobile 
across sectors and, for the purpose of comparability, that the policies have identical 
nominal NHS budget implications. In order to illustrate the social welfare effects of 
protection of the wage of the medical profession following immigration we also report 
the  results  of  the  immigration  policy  when  the  wages  of  doctors  and  nurses  are 
allowed  to  fall.  The  sensitivity  analyses  reveal  the  importance  of  the  size  of  the 
indirect  health  effects,  i.e.  the  impacts  of  an  increase  in  health  provisioning  on 
effective (“able to work”) labour endowments. The final section concludes.  
                                                 
13   See Rutten (2004) for an elaborate description of the CGE model.   6 
2. Patterns of migration of health workers into the UK 
This  section  describes  the  flows  of  medical  personnel  into  the  UK,  focusing  on 
doctors and nurses, compares these with medical migration flows to other developed 
countries, and looks at evidence of offsetting financial flows to the country of origin.
14 
The flow of doctors into the UK 
Since  1993  the  annual  inflow  of  doctors  from  both  the  European  Economic  Area 
(EEA) and elsewhere has more than doubled (Table 1).
15 In contrast the number of 
new doctor registrants qualified in the UK has increased only gradually, by 27% over 
the time period 1993-2004. As a share of all new registrations, those from overseas by 
far outweigh those from the EEA (45% compared to 19% in 2004, see Figure 1).  
Table 1: New registrations of doctors in the UK by region of qualification 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
UK 3675 3657 3710 3822 3920 4010 4242 4214 4462 4288 4443 4658
EEA 1188 1444 1779 2084 1860 1590 1392 1192 1237 1448 1770 2419
Overseas 2500 2539 3327 4047 3678 3580 2889 2993 3088 4456 9336 5683
Total 7363 7640 8816 9953 9458 9180 8523 8399 8787 10192 15549 12760  
Source: General Medical Council Annual Review 2004-2005, Buchan and Dovlo (2004, Table 1) 
                                                 
14   The in-country distribution of health personnel is outside the scope of this paper (see for example Batata (2005) for nurses). 
Similarly, there is some emigration of health personnel, especially by UK nurses (Nursing and Midwifery Council Statistics 
2004-2005), but also by physicians (see Forcier et al. 2004). Since outflows are less than inflows, and most are destined for 
developed  countries,  this  issue  is  ignored.  We  nonetheless  recognise  that  outflows  contribute  to  in-country  work  force 
shortages. 
15   Registration data. Whilst having the limitation of signifying intent rather than actuality of working in the destination country 
and  multiple  cross/in-country  applications,  the  data  do  give  an  indication  of  the  trends  in  and  relative  importance  of 
international flows (Buchan et al. 2003, Buchan and Sochalski, 2004).   7 
Figure 1: Share of new registrations of doctors in the UK coming from abroad 
 
In  2004  the  number  of  new  registrations  of  doctors  from  the  ten  EU  accession 
countries from the EEA increased markedly (by 37% compared to 2003), a break with 
the trend of previous years. This appears to have been a substitute for new overseas 
registrations, which declined by 40% compared to the previous year. This has brought 
down the total of new doctor registrations (from abroad) for the second time since the 
peaks in 1996 and subsequently in 2003. 
Table 2: Hospital, Public Health Medicine and Community Health Services medical staff 
and General Practitioners by region of qualification 
All Countries of Qualification 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
All Doctors (1)(2)(3) 77947 81003 83094 86052 88227 90365 92789 95637 99696 105230 113184
Qualified in the United Kingdom 58286 60012 60900 62569 64105 65442 67025 68785 70245 73134 76733
Qualified in the remainder of the EEA 3816 4270 4702 4895 4855 5073 5014 5131 5478 5819 6285
Qualified within the whole of Africa 1635 1882 2158 2599 2869 3224 3630 4013 4679 5104 5590
Qualified within Sub-Saharan Africa 1109 1292 1489 1821 2008 2225 2499 2772 3242 3578 3928
Qualified within Northern Africa 526 590 669 778 861 999 1131 1241 1437 1526 1662
Qualified elsewhere in the world 14210 14839 15334 15989 16398 16626 17120 17708 19294 21173 24576
(1) Excludes all staff with a dental specialty. Information about country of qualification is derived from the General Medical Council. 
For staff in dental specialties, with a General Dental Council registration, the country of qualification is unknown.
(2) Excludes medical Hospital Practitioners and medical Clinical Assistants, most of whom are also GPs working part time in hospitals.
(3) Excludes GP Retainers.  
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Figure 2: Medical doctors in the NHS by region of qualification 
 
Department of Health data on the region of training of doctors working in the NHS in 
England give an indication of the level of employment, i.e. the “stock”, of doctors by 
region (Table 2).
16 Although the majority of medical doctors in the NHS continue to 
come from the UK’s education system, the number having increased by 32% over the 
last ten years, the proportion has declined from approximately 3 in 4 doctors in 1994 
to 2 in 3 doctors in 2004. In contrast, the number qualified in the EEA has increased 
by 60%, whereas the number qualified in the African region has more than doubled 
during this period (an increase of 243%). The employment in the NHS of medical 
doctors trained elsewhere in the world has risen by 73%. The latter category, coming 
from countries such as India and the Philippines, has experienced the greatest increase 
relative to overall NHS employment levels of medical doctors, from 18% in 1994 to 
22% in 2004, most of which has taken place since 2001 (Figure 2).  
The flow of nurses into the UK 
Over the last seven years the inflow of nurses to the UK from non-EEA countries has 
risen sharply (Table 3). India has become the main source country, displacing the 
Philippines  from  that  position  in  2003/04.  Other  important  source  countries  are 
Australia and South Africa.  
                                                 
16   Since, as with nurses, most recruitment of doctors to the UK is destined for the NHS, the situation that  is depicted is 
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Table 3: Initial admissions of nurses and midwives* by the top 25 countries of training 
 
* Only 22 out of 11,477 admissions to the registry were midwives. The UK currently does not admit midwives from any of the 
top three countries. 
Source: Nursing and Midwifery Council Statistical Data 2001-02 to 2004-05 
Since 2003/04 the number of new entrants on the nurse registry from overseas has 
fallen – from Sub-Saharan Africa by 28% and from elsewhere in the world by 16%, 
although  some  countries  within  these  groups  have  witnessed  a  rise  in  new  nurse 
registrants in the UK, most notably India (by 20%). With the total of nurse admissions 
from abroad declining since 2003/04, the share of new entries on the nurse registry 
coming from the UK is rising again (Figure 3). The share of new admissions from the 
EEA has remained broadly constant, despite the accession of 10 countries to the EU. 
Country 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
India 30 96 289 994 1830 3073 3690
Philippines 52 1052 3396 7235 5593 4338 2521
Australia 1335 1209 1046 1342 920 1326 981
South Africa 599 1460 1086 2114 1368 1689 933
Nigeria 179 208 347 432 509 511 466
West Indies 221 425 261 248 208 397 352
Zimbabwe 52 221 382 473 485 391 311
New Zealand 527 461 393 443 282 348 289
Ghana 40 74 140 195 251 354 272
Pakistan 3 13 44 207 172 140 205
Zambia 15 40 88 183 133 169 162
USA 139 168 147 122 88 141 105
Mauritius 6 15 41 62 59 95 102
Kenya 19 29 50 155 152 146 99
Botswana 4 - 87 100 39 90 91
Canada 196 130 89 79 52 89 88
Nepal 71 43 73
Swaziland 81 69
China 60
Malawi 1 15 45 75 57 64 52
Srilanka 23 36 47
Lesotho 50 43
Japan 20 37 34
Singapore 28
Sierra Leone 24
Others 203 329 472 605 418 514 380
Sub-Saharan Africa 915 2062 2266 3789 3053 3640 2624
Other overseas 2706 3883 6137 11275 9677 10482 8853
Total overseas 3621 5945 8403 15064 12730 14122 11477
EEA 1413 1416 1295 1091 802 1030 1193
UK 14035 14538 18216 19462 19982    10 
Figure 3: Share of new registrations of nurses and midwives in the UK coming from 
abroad 
 
No  data  are  available  as  yet  on  the  level  of  employment  of  nurses  by  region  of 
primary  qualification.  Buchan  and  Dovlo  (2004)  suggest  that  in  October  2002 
approximately 42000 international nurses were employed in the UK, equivalent to 8% 
of the total 525,000 number of nurses registered. Glover et al. (2001) report that 31% 
of practising doctors and 13% of nurses were born outside the UK.
17 
Migration of other health personnel: how do migration flows compare? 
Data on migration flows of other health personnel are not available, although data on 
work permits granted to health care professionals (Table 4) show that the majority are 
granted to nurses (61%) and doctors (7%), all higher skilled, suggesting that inflows 
of  other  types  of  workers  are  relatively  less  important  for  the  UK  health  system. 
Moreover, whereas the number of work permits given to foreign nurses increased 
significantly from 2000 to 2001 (by 59%), this growth seems to have slowed down 
markedly, the increase in work permits granted to nurses over the period 2002-2003 
being only 5%. In contrast, the growth in work permits granted to foreign doctors, 
starting from a low level in 2001, grew by 156% and 51% over the periods 2001-02 
                                                 






































































   11 
and 2002-03 respectively (in absolute terms this was less than the increase in work 
permits granted to nurses).  
Table 4: Work permits granted to health care professionals by occupation 
 
na: not available 
Source: House of Commons Hansard. Written answers for 23 February 2004 
Note that with a total of 113,184 doctors working in the NHS in 2004/05 (Table 2), 
the 8,102 new doctors on the registry from outside the UK (Table 1) have a share of 
7%. This exceeds the 3% that the newly registered nurses from abroad (12670 in 
2004/05 from Table 3) represent in a total of 397,500 qualified nurses working in the 
NHS.
18  Hence,  the  inflow  of  doctors  into  the  UK  health  sector  is  relatively  large 
compared to the inflow of nurses when taking into account present “stocks” of doctors 
and nurses. Evidence of nurses having to take over some of the responsibilities of 
doctors, so as to alleviate their task, suggests that doctors in the UK are in relatively 
short supply, causing greater migration flows in relative terms.
19  
A breakdown by country of origin (Table 5), unfortunately only available for the 
aggregate, reveals similar source countries as  for admissions of nurses to the  UK 
(Table 3). 
                                                 
18   Department of Health (2004a). Using the total number of registered doctors, 216,468 in 2003 (General Medical Council, 
2003), and nurses, 639,390 in 2004 (Nursing and Midwifery Council Statistical Data 2004-05) in the UK, the percentages are 
4% and 2% for doctors and nurses respectively. 
19   Nurses as good as trainee doctors, BBC News, December 6, 2002. According to this report, the NHS may not have a 
shortage of nurses; perceived shortages may be caused by nurses having to perform non-clinical tasks. 
Occupation 2000 2001 2002 2003
Nurse 14123 22414 25926 27171
Doctor na 762 1948 2947
Pharmacist 411 471 443 409
Physiotherapist 157 261 357 389
Radiographer na 155 352 384
Medical practitioner 543 852 524 340
Researcher 243 267 378 339
Social worker na na na  208
Dental surgeon 162 218 238 201
Psychiatrist 99 188 213 189
Assistant dentist 140 na na na
Veterinary surgeon 114 na na na
Occupational therapist 90 135 194 na
Others 3879 4854 7884 11866
Total 19961 30577 38457 44443    12 
Table 5: Work permits granted to health professionals in the UK by country of origin 
 
na: not available 
Source: House of Commons Hansard. Written answers for 23 February 2004 
How does the UK compare to other developed countries? 
The effects of medical migration on source countries are worst for English-speaking 
Sub-Saharan African countries, stemming from the “pull” of the English speaking 
countries, especially the UK and North America.
20 As a result, about 12% of all Sub-
Saharan doctors work in the UK, USA and Canada.
21 While data on international 
migration flows of medical personnel are patchy
22, we nonetheless aim to provide an 
overview of the main trends, focussing on English-speaking countries, with the USA 
as the largest country of destination. 
Given its history of migration and the unprecedented scale of health expenditure, it is 
not surprising that the USA is the key driver of worldwide medical migration. The 
USA is reported to have a shortage of pharmacists and nursing staff, and the previous 
physician surplus is predicted by many to change into a shortage.
23  
                                                 
20   Forcier et al. (2004). Eastwood et al. (2005) notes that despite the importance of French language internationally, only 
around 5% of practicing doctors in France qualified overseas.  
21   Hagopian et al. (2004). 
22   Diallo (2004) elaborates on sources, uses and challenges for migration data. 
23   Bach (2003). 
Country of origin 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Philippines na  na na na 1770 6592 10017 11143 12014
India 209 276 318 457 916 1939 4137 6482 9835
South Africa 102 190 420 753 2024 2880 4132 5728 5880
Zimbabwe 76 146 142 225 581 1149 1959 2646 2825
Nigeria 116 133 196 338 688 1046 1329 1814 1510
Australia 100 189 357 438 720 827 1097 1241 1292
China Peoples Republic of na na na na na na 539 713 1068
Pakistan 68 96 112 na na 391 799 861 964
Ghana na na na na na na  565 631 850
Bulgaria na na na na na na na 599 787
Mauritius 157 200 162 187 na na  na na na
Trinidad and Tobago 151 192 198 278 501 471 na na na
United States of America 112 127 187 232 376 401 na na na
Malaysia 57 82 na 178 272 na  na na na
Canada na na 102 na na na  na na na
New Zealand na na na 192 259 390 488 na na
Others 475 650 926 1465 2629 3874 5514 6598 7417
Total 1623 2281 3120 4743 10736 19960 30576 38456 44442    13 
Table 6: International Medical Graduates (IMGs) in the USA and Canada in 2002 
 
Source: Hagopian et al. (2004) 
The  USA  has  attracted  5,334  Sub-Saharan  African  medical  graduates  to  work  as 
physicians in 2002 compared to 2151 going to Canada (Table 6) and 3,242 to the UK 
(Table 2). The majority (86%) come from Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana. The most 
popular four origin countries for the USA in 2002 were India, the Philippines, Mexico 
and Pakistan, together accounting for 10% of all physicians in the USA. Of the 23% 
of internationally qualified physicians working in the USA, approximately two-thirds 
come from low and lower-middle income countries.
24 
The main source countries of nurses for the USA over the period 1997-2000 are the 
Philippines, Canada and Africa, primarily Nigeria and South Africa (Table 7). Over 
this  period  applicants  from  the  Philippines  roughly  doubled  whereas  those  from 
Canada fell by approximately half. The ratio of newly licensed foreign-trained nurses 
to US-trained nurses fell from approximately 10.5% in 1995 to 5.5% in 1998, after 
                                                 
24   In 2004, the most popular source countries are India, Philippines, Pakistan and Canada, accounting for 9.3% of all physicians 
in the USA (Mullan, 2005). In this year, international medical graduates make up 25% of the medical workforce, of which 
60% come from low- and lower-middle income countries. 
Country of training Number of IMGs in USA Number of IMGs in Canada
Sub-Saharan Africa 5334 2151
Nigeria 2158 123














Low and lower-middle 
income countries 115835
All countries 179978
Total number of 
physicians in USA 771491    14 
which it increased to nearly 15% in 2002.
25 Consequently, the share of international 
nurses as a percentage of current stock has risen to 11% (303,000 nurses), of which 
80% comes from developing countries (approximately 31% from the Philippines, 26% 
from the Caribbean/Latin America, 5% from India, 10% from rest of Asia, 5% from 
Africa and 3% from Eastern Europe/Russia).
26 
Table 7: International nurses applying for a US Registered Nurse licensure, 1997-2000 
 
Source: Buchan et al. (2003) 
The  average  of  6,627  international  nurses  per  year  applying  for  a  US  Registered 
Nurse  (RN)  licensure  in  1997-2000  only  slightly  exceeds  the  6,198  average  new 
international admissions to the UK nurse registry for 1998/99-1999/2000 (Table 3), 
but is less than the 14,123 work permits granted to nurses in the UK in 2000 (Table 
4). Although the number of applicants to the US RN licensure has risen to over 14,000 
in  2004
27  and  exceeds  the  12,670  new  international  admissions  to  the  UK  nurse 
registry in 2004/05 (Table 3), the data suggest that the UK is an important recruiter of 
nurses internationally, especially when the size of each country’s health care system is 
taken into account.
28 Buchan et al. (2005) and Buchan and Sochalski (2004) moreover 
find that the UK in particular has become increasingly reliant on recruitment from 
developing countries, with approximately 79% of nurse inflows coming from lower-
                                                 
25   Buchan and Solchalski (2004). 
26   Aiken (2005) 
27   Aiken (2005). 
28   The average American spends about 2.5 times as much on health care as a UK citizen. With a population of 5 times that of 
the UK, the health sector in the USA (measured by total health expenditures) is approximately 12.5 times that of the UK 
(World Health Report 2005, World Health Organization).  
Country of origin Number Percentage
Philippines 8641 33
Canada 5831 22
Africa (mainly Nigeria and South Africa) 1961 7
Republic of Korea 1882 7
India 1537 6
UK 1166 4
Russian Federation 583 2
Australia 345 1




Total number of applications 26506 100    15 
middle and low-income countries in 2001-02, compared to 72% for the USA and 36% 
for Ireland. 
Financial flows: are inflows of workers accompanied by outflows of remittances? 
The benefits of inflows of health professionals to the UK, as has been documented in 
the previous subsections, are obvious; rather than having to train a doctor for 5 or 6 
years at a cost of approximately £220,000 or a nurse at a cost of about £12,500 to fill 
up staff shortages, a migrant doctor or nurse is immediately available at zero cost.
29 In 
this  way  the  UK  has  saved £65  million  in training  costs  for the  doctors and  £38 
million for the nurses it has taken from Ghana since 1998.
30 Empirical evidence does 
not  substantiate  offsetting  negative  effects  of  migration  on  unemployment  rates: 
effects on wages are found to have been negative but small, and migrants seem to 
contribute more in taxes than they receive in social security, thereby contributing to 
the fiscal system and economic growth in general in industrial countries.
31 The total 
net gain from medical migration to the UK however depends largely on the total of 
remittances sent home by migrant workers.  
The evidence on the magnitude of world-wide remittance flows by migrant workers is 
mixed and difficult to establish since large proportions are transferred informally and 
are therefore not recorded in official statistics. The World Bank estimates that in 2005 
total remittances world-wide exceeded 232$ billion, of which developing countries 
received  US$167  billion,  less  than  FDI  inflows  but  larger  (and  more  stable)  than 
capital market flows and official development assistance.
32 There is little information 
on how much can be attributed to health workers.  
Health workers, who generally come from higher income households that are in lesser 
need of remittances, and in particular those who migrate permanently seem to remit 
                                                 
29   Eastwood et al. (2005). Note that some migrant workers need additional language/professional training (Glover et al. 2001, 
Forcier et al. 2004). 
30   Mensah et al. (2005). Martineau et al. (2002) state that this may hinder the development of domestic health worker supply 
and speaks of the perverse incentive arising from the potential cost savings to underestimate the need of workers as the gap 
can be filled from overseas. Whereas migrant workers are willing to work in less popular areas, they do tend to go home for 
public holidays and are often being lured to other countries with competitive salaries complicating work force planning.  
31   Buchan et al. (2003), World Bank (2005a). Glover et al. (2001) estimate a net fiscal gain in 1998/99 for the UK of £2.6 
billion. The challenge of migration to local workers is equivalent to that imposed by imports of labour-intensive goods from 
developing countries, which could easily be compensated out of the overall welfare gain of migration (Winters, 2003b). 
32   World Bank (2005c). Unrecorded flows are conservatively estimated to add at least 50% of official remittance flows.   16 
less than lower skilled short-term migrants.
33 Evidence suggests that doctors generally 
migrate  permanently  and  so  remit  insignificant  amounts,  while  nurses  migrate 
temporarily and remit a lot more.
34 Other studies point out that, while fewer high 
skilled migrants remit, when they do then they may well remit more, especially when 
lucrative  investment  opportunities  are  involved.
35  More  importantly  however,  the 
magnitude of outward remittances largely depends on where migrants come from: 
countries such as China, India, the Philippines, Egypt and Cuba with a surplus of 
health professionals actively send health professionals abroad since remittances are 
considered an important source of revenues. For the Pacific islands of Tonga and 
Samoa the income from remittances is estimated to equal total GDP, and remittances 
by migrant nurses not only exceed those made by other migrants but also outweigh 
the  cost  of  additional  human  capital  in  nurse  training.
36  Similarly,  remittances  by 
Philippine physicians were found to outweigh the economic losses of emigration.
37 In 
contrast, recorded remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa are highly volatile and comprise 
the  lowest  dollar  amounts  of  any  poor  world  region  (less  than  US$  5  billion), 
primarily due to a high level of informal flows stemming from strong intraregional 
migration and an underdeveloped financial sector.
38 
Since  magnitudes  of  remittance  flows  are  difficult  to  establish  and  vary  by  the 
migrants’ country of origin, we vary the share of migrant income remitted in the CGE 
model experiments. 
                                                 
33   Martineau et al. (2002), World Bank (2005a). 
34   Dovlo and Martineau (2004). 
35   Lowell and Findlay (2002). 
36   Connell and Brown (2004).  
37   Forcier et al. (2004), Diallo (2004). 
38   Hagopian et al. (2004), Stilwell et al (2003), World Bank (2005a). Remittance flows nonetheless vary by country, as does the 
development impact.   17 
3. Existing national (UK) and international policy on migration 
Flows  of  workers  to  the  health  sectors  in  the  UK  and  other  developed  countries 
depend not only on the push and pull factors encouraging health workers to migrate, 
but also on national and international migration policies. Given that in the future both 
push and pull factors are likely to remain important – and in the case of the latter may 
well  increase  in  strength  due  to  an  ageing  population  and  medical  work  force, 
insufficient  medical  education  levels  and  rising  health  expenditures  in  developed 
countries – it has been argued that it is important to actively “manage” migration 
flows  such  that  they  benefit  both  destination  and  source  countries.
39  This  section 
documents  the  UK  and  international  policies  currently  in  place  that  govern 
international medical migration.  
UK policy towards medical migration 
Concerns about ethical recruitment led the UK to develop in 2001 a Code of Practice 
for International Recruitment by which it limits recruitment to the two countries with 
which it has signed a health worker-migration agreement (India and the Philippines) 
which  allows  for  controlled  migration  of  health  personnel.
40  All  other  developing 
countries are on the so-called “proscribed list”, which will not be targeted for active 
recruitment by the NHS.
41 A major drawback of the original Code of Practice was that 
it did not cover private employers and recruitment agencies, which led the Department 
of Health to change the Code in 2004. 
Since migration could be related to education, individual initiatives by health workers 
or (up to 2004) non-NHS employers, the continued inflow of nurses and doctors from 
developing countries does not necessarily suggest that the impact of the Department 
of Health Code of Practice has been limited.
42 However, the decline between 2003 
and  2004  in  both  nurse  and  doctor  inflows  from  overseas  (Tables  1  and  3)  may 
indicate that it is starting to take effect. Developments in medical migration flows into 
                                                 
39   Glover et al. (2001).  
40   Department of Health (2004b). The original Code from 2001 does not cover non-NHS employers, individual initiatives by 
health  workers  themselves  and  inflows  related  to  education  purposes.  The  revised  2004  Code  does  cover  non-NHS 
employers.   
41   Department of Health (2005). The list is based on the OECD/DAC list of aid recipients. Underlying criteria: economic status 
and relative position with regards to numbers of health personnel. 
42   Buchan and Dovlo (2004).   18 
the UK over the longer term will signify whether this is a one-off event or a sustained 
effect resulting from a more ethical recruitment process as governed by the Code of 
Practice. It is clear however that the Code of Practice on its own does not address the 
push and more notably the pull factors which govern migration flows to the UK in the 
first  place.  These  require  developed  and  developing  country  policies  which  are 
targeted at increasing the training of medical personnel worldwide and promoting the 
retention of health professionals, especially in underserved areas, and the return of 
migrant workers.
43 
The international institutional architecture related to medical migration 
At the international level, a number of institutions are active in the area of health 
worker migration. The World Bank, as a proponent of increased globalisation for the 
purpose of long-term economic growth, has in the past proposed that “health services 
are another area in which developing countries could become major exporters,..., by 
temporarily  sending  their  health  personnel  abroad.”
44  The  International  Labor 
Organization  (ILO),  the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO),  the  International 
Organization  for  Migration  (IOM)  and  the  independent  Global  Commission  on 
International Migration (GCIM) also acknowledge the importance of labour migration 
in general for the world economy, but have expressed their concern about the impact 
of medical labour migration in undermining the performance of health systems and 
the achievement of the health-related Millennium Development Goals.
45  
International migration of health personnel is expected to gain momentum in future 
through progress within the negotiations on Mode 4 of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). GATS Mode 4, 
by which services can be traded via the movement of natural persons, relates to the 
provision of health services by individuals in another country on a temporary basis.
46  
                                                 
43   Eastwood et al. (2005), Buchan et al. (2003). 
44   Hilary (2002). The World Bank and IMF have also been accused of enforcing public expenditure cuts on the health sector as 
a condition of their assistance, which they say rather reflect a county’s perverse prioritisation.  
45   GCIM (2005). 
46   See Benavides (2002), Hilary (2001), WHO (2001, 2002), WTO-WHO (2002) for more on trade in health services and 
GATS. GATS does not cover public services, i.e. services provided in the exercise of government authority (defined as being 
provided  neither  on  a  commercial  basis,  nor  in  competition).  Commitments  under  Mode  4  take  the  shape  of  access 
conditions granted by potential host countries and so do not cover commitments by countries of origin.   19 
There  are,  however,  several  problems  with  the  current  formulation  of  Mode  4.
47 
Firstly, the term ‘temporary’ has been defined only negatively as excluding permanent 
migration and there is no international consensus on the definition. This could be to 
the benefit of source countries by limiting the time for which health workers can go 
abroad and so reducing the possibility of permanently losing costly human capital. 
However, the term ‘temporary’ may not entail much significance since is difficult to 
enforce in practice: temporary workers, once they have migrated, may be unwilling to 
move back to their home country after their contracts have finished and may become 
permanent  residents  (to  the  point  where  they  disappear  into  illegality).  Secondly, 
persons  are  seen  as  service  providers,  not  as  entrants  to  the  labour  market.  This 
distinction  is  difficult  to  maintain  in  practice  since  a  temporary  residency  often 
implies that the service provider will have entered the local labour market. This, and 
the modest commitments made on Mode 4 so far (currently accounting for only 1.4% 
of the value of services trade), can be explained by the fear of (developed) countries 
that  they  may  lose  their  ability  to  regulate  immigration  and  the  fear  of  potential 
negative impacts on the national economy. Thirdly, the GATS framework allows for 
domestic regulations regarding the requirements to practice of health professionals in 
order to safeguard the quality and safety of health service provision. These act as a 
barrier to entry by health professionals to developed host countries so as to protect the 
income  of  domestic  health  professionals.  In  some  cases  requirements  regarding 
qualification  and  licences  are  said  to  have  led  to  discrimination  against  foreign 
physicians.
48 More generally, GATS service liberalisation is typically biased towards 
liberalising  the  movement  of  highly  skilled  personnel,  rather  than  creating  new 
employment  opportunities  worldwide  for  the  unskilled,  an  area  of  comparative 
advantage for developing countries. This may however benefit the health sector, since 
it is relatively skill-intensive. 
Despite  these  problems  and  the  limited  progress  so  far,  expectations  are  high  for 
future  progress  in  the  area  of  international  medical  migration  since  there  is  a 
continuing  momentum  towards  the  enlargement  of  regional  trade  blocks  and  the 
                                                 
47   Bach (2003), Forcier et al. (2004), Stilwell et al. (2003), Lowell and Findlay (2002), Hilary (2001), WHO (2001, 2002), 
Winters (2003a), Winters et al. (2003), Bhatnagar (2004). 
48   Forcier et al. (2004).   20 
harmonisation of medical qualifications worldwide. The WTO recognises that in this 
process  there  will  be  benefits  from  surplus  countries  filling  up  gaps  in  shortage 
countries and more generally benefits of lower health care prices worldwide, but also 
risks of brain drains exacerbating health personnel shortages and problems of access 
to  and  the  quality  of  health  services  in  developing  countries.
49  The  WTO  thus 
recommends  that  countries  impose  appropriate  regulations  so  that  national  health 
policy goals are not undermined by trade in health services.
50  
International  organisations  other  than  the  WTO  have  attempted  to  draw  up  and 
strengthen codes of practice. Ratification by all members, however, often does not 
materialise  since  the  priorities  of  destination  and  source  countries,  cost-effective 
international recruitment and a more equitable terms of trade respectively, are found 
to  be  incompatible.
51  As  a  long-term  solution,  the  GCIM  therefore  proposes  an 
overhaul of the institutional migration architecture by establishing, in 2006, one Inter-
agency Global Migration Facility responsible for all migration policies to create a 
more effective and coherent response to the opportunities and challenges posed by 
international migration. As a short-term solution a high-level inter-institutional group 
could pave the way for such a facility.
52 When these proposals will be implemented 
and how they will affect international medical migration remains as yet unknown. 
                                                 
49   WTO-WHO (2002).  
50   GATS  for  example  allows  sending  countries  to  discourage  medical  migration  via  negative  measures,  such  as  taxing 
emigrating personnel or demanding financial compensation from recruiting countries/organisations, and positive measures, 
such as better employment/living conditions at home. Since  most developing countries have insufficient regulatory and 
enforcement capacity to do so, strengthening their regulatory capacity is a major challenge for the coming years.  
51   The Commonwealth has for example adopted a Code of Practice in 2003, though Canada, Australia and the UK have not 
signed the agreement, seemingly due to the addition of clauses related to compensation for countries of origin (Buchan and 
Dovlo, 2004). See Bach (2003) for more on international standards and trade agreements. 
52   GCIM (2005).   21 
4. Medical migration into the UK: some low-dimension analytics 
In order to provide some intuition in support of the formal analysis that follows we 
start with a simplified diagrammatic representation of the interrelationships between 
health provision, the number of workers treated successfully and so returning to work, 
and the outputs of two tradable goods. The approach is based on that commonly used 
in  the  explanation  of  ‘Rybczynski  effects’  in  the  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
53 
(HOS) model following exogenous changes in factor endowments.  
The Rybczynski theorem
54 predicts that at constant product prices, and hence constant 
factor  prices,  and  with  factors  of  production  that  are  perfectly  mobile  between 
domestic sectors, an exogenous increase in the endowment of one factor (but not of 
the other) will lead to an increase in output in the sector using the increased factor 
more  intensively  and  a  decrease  in  the  output  of  the  other  sector.  An  important 
corollary is that an exogenous equiproportionate increase in the endowments of both 
factors will lead to the same proportionate increase in the output of both sectors. Since 
any increase in both factor endowments can be decomposed into an equiproportionate 
increase in both endowments and an increase in the endowment of one of the factors, 
we have the more general result that the output of one sector must increase while the 
change in the output of the other is in general indeterminate. 
Here  however  we  are  concerned  with  changes  in  factor  endowments  that  are 
endogenously determined in that the government decides on, and finances, the size of 
the non-tradable health care sector. An increase in the size of that sector reduces the 
factor endowments available to the tradables production sectors
55 directly. However it 
also increases those endowments indirectly via a decrease in the numbers of workers 
who cannot work due to ill health and so are on the health-care waiting list, leading to 
a  range  of  possible  outcomes.  A  further  complication  is  that  most  of  the  skilled 
workers in the health sector have health-specific skills that take time to acquire and 
are not readily transferable to other domestic sectors. This implies that in the short 
term the health sector can only expand by using more unskilled labour or by recruiting 
                                                 
53   Characterised by the assumptions of two goods, two factors that are perfectly mobile within each country but immobile 
between countries, perfect competition and constant returns to scale. 
54   Rybczynski (1955). 
55   In the simple model used here these are an export good and an import good.   22 
skilled  workers  with  health-specific  skills  from  other  countries.  In  this  case  the 
standard ‘Rybczynski effects’ predicted by the HOS model must be modified, and the 
analysis becomes closer to that of the Specific Factors model. 
The diagrammatic analysis starts with the specification of an initial equilibrium, using 
the  standard  ‘factor  endowment  box’  diagram.  It  next  considers  the  two  ways  of 
expanding the output of the health sector in the short term identified above: first by 
increasing the employment of unskilled labour with no change in the use of skilled 
labour,  and  then  by  recruiting  immigrant  skilled  labour  (with  an  accompanying 
increase in the use of unskilled labour). 
Finally  it  examines  the  effects  of  increasing  the  supply  of  domestic  skilled  (and 
unskilled) workers to the health sector (in the absence of immigrant skilled workers), 
which implies the possibility of a reduction in the skilled workers available to the 
tradables sectors.
56  It is probable that a high proportion of the skilled workers in the 
health sector have health-specific skills, and that there are few skilled workers in the 
tradables sectors who possess those skills. Thus such an expansion is likely to be 
feasible only in the longer term (i.e. existing skilled domestic workers who do not 
have health-specific skills would have to be taught those skills before they could enter 
the health sector). For simplicity we assume here that all skilled workers in the health 
sector have sector-specific skills.  
The diagrammatic analysis is useful in identifying the varied effects of different ways 
of  expanding  of  the  health  sector  on  the  effective  endowments  of  labour  and  the 
outputs  of  the  other  production  sectors.  However  it  is  limited  in  that  there  are  a 
number of possible cases, consideration of which would require multiple diagrams. 
Moreover, it does not cast any light on induced changes in the welfare of those able to 
work  or  of  the  population  as  a  whole.  To  remedy  this  the  final  sections  use  the 
standard ‘Jones’ analysis to derive formally the changes in sectoral outputs in a more 
general setting and to identify the changes in the per capita income both of those in 
employment and of the population as a whole. 
                                                 
56   We assume that only skilled workers can be given health-specific skills. This reduces directly the supply of skilled workers 
to the tradables sectors, but will lead to an reduction in the number of skilled workers who are unable to work because of ill 
health.   23 
A possible initial equilibrium 
Figure 4 shows a ‘factor endowment box’, identified by the south-west and north-east 
corners  H O  and  W O  respectively. The vertical and horizontal dimensions measure 
the total endowments of skilled labour (S) and unskilled labour (U) respectively. 
Inputs of skilled and unskilled labour to the health sector are measured from  H O , and 
the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers unable to work (on the ‘waiting list’ for 
health care) are measured from  W O . The skilled and unskilled workers available to 
work in the tradables sectors 1 and 2 are thus shown by the dimensions of the inner 
factor  box,  identified  by  the  south-west  and  north-east  corners,  1 O   and  2 O  
respectively. Labour inputs to tradables sector 1 are measured from  1 O  and those to 
tradables sector 2 from  2 O . 
For simplicity it is assumed that at the given factor prices
57 the health sector has the 
same skill intensity as the economy, and that the incidence of illness, the provision of 
treatment and the responsiveness to that treatment are identical for all workers. Thus 
the north-east corner of the ‘health box’ and the south-west corner of the ‘waiting list 
box’ lie on the diagonal of the total endowment box,  H W O O . 
Figure 4: An initial equilibrium 
 
                                                 
57   In the tradables sectors in a small open economy (i.e. one trading at given commodity prices) the wages of skilled and 
unskilled labour are uniquely determined. The health sector employs unskilled labour that could work in the tradables sectors 
and so receives the same wage. This then determines the wage of the health-specific skilled workers (the standard result for a 
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In  the  initial  equilibrium  numbers  H S   and  H U   of  skilled  and  unskilled  labour 
respectively are employed in the health sector. These provide a health output that 
treats ill workers to the extent that numbers  W S  and  W U  of skilled and unskilled 
labour remain on the waiting list and hence are unable to work. Thus the numbers of 
skilled  and  unskilled  labour  available  to  work  in  the  tradables  sectors  are 
T H W S  = S-S -S  and  T H W U  = U-U -U  respectively, these being the dimensions of the 
factor box defined by  1 O  and  2 O . The given relative factor prices determine the skill 
intensities in the two tradables sectors (sector 1 being the more skill-intensive), and 
the  intersection  of  the  rays  1 1 O X   and  2 2 O X   at  point  a  determines  the  full 
employment outputs of sectors 1 and 2. 
Expanding the health sector using only unskilled domestic workers 
Figure  5  illustrates  the  effects  of  an  expansion  of  the  health  sector  using  only 
domestic  unskilled  workers  (the  endowment  of  health-specific  skilled  workers 
remaining at  H S ). The employment of unskilled workers increases from  H U  to  #
H U , 
so  that  the  health  sector’s  factor  box  is  now  that  defined  by  H O   and  #
1 O .  The 
additional health provision reduces the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers on 
the waiting list from  W S  and  W U  to  #
W S  and  #
W U . The supply of skilled workers to 
the tradables sectors necessarily increases (by  #
W W S -S ), but the supply of unskilled 
workers to those sectors rises if  #
W W U -U  is greater than  #
H H U -U  and falls otherwise.   25 
Figure 5: An expansion of the health sector using only domestic unskilled workers 
 
The factor box for the tradables sectors is now that defined by  #
1 O  and  #
2 O , and the 
new tradables equilibrium is at point b. Given the assumption that the incidence of 
illness,  the  provision  of  treatment  and  the  responsiveness  to  that  treatment  are 
identical for all workers, the output of sector 1 necessarily increases. The output of 
sector 2 will decrease unless the growth in the supply of unskilled workers to the 
tradables sectors is large enough to overcome the reduction effect of the expansion of 
the supply of skilled workers.
58 These results depend on, inter alia, the ‘efficiency’ of 
the health sector in treating and curing workers who are on the health care waiting list. 
For example, a neutral improvement in health sector technology will further increase 
the output of sector 1 and reduce the likelihood of a decrease in sector 2 output. The 
increase in the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers in the health sector implies that the 
marginal  product  of  the  skilled  workers  increases,  and  so  their  real  wage  also 
increases. 
Expanding the health sector by importing workers with health-specific skills 
The alternative short-term method of expanding the health sector is to recruit workers 
with equivalent health-specific skills from other countries. This increases the vertical 
                                                 
58    If the increase in the supply of unskilled workers is less than or equal to zero then the output of sector 2 necessarily falls. If 
the proportionate increases in the supplies of both types of worker are the same then the outputs of both sectors increase by 
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dimension of the economy’s factor box, which is shown in Figure 6 by extending its 
vertical dimension downwards. If the immigrant skilled workers are paid the same 
wage as their domestic counterparts then the skill intensity in the health sector will be 
unchanged. Figure 6 has been drawn on the assumption that the recruitment of skilled 
workers is that which will result in the same increase in the employment of unskilled 
workers  in  the  health  sector  as  in  the  previous  case  (i.e.  *
H H U -U = #
H H U -U ).  The 
increase in the employment of skilled workers in the health sector, with the same 
increase in unskilled labour, increases its output compared to the previous case, and so 
results in greater reductions in the waiting lists, i.e.  + #
W W S <S  and  + #
W W U <U . 
Figure 6: An expansion of the health sector using immigrant skilled workers 
 
Compared to the previous scenario there is a greater increase in the supply of skilled 
labour to the tradables sectors, and a smaller fall (greater rise) in that of unskilled 
labour, the new factor box for the tradables sectors now being that defined by  +
1 O  and 
+
2 O , with the new equilibrium at point c. Thus the output of sector 1 will increase by 
more than previously, while that of sector 2 will fall by less (or increase by more). 
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favourable implications for the outputs of the two tradables sectors compared to an 
expansion using only the additional unskilled workers.
59 
Expanding the health sector by using more skilled and unskilled domestic workers 
Figure 7 shows the consequences of an expansion of the health sector using both 
domestic skilled and unskilled workers but no immigrant labour with health-specific 
skills.  To  facilitate  comparison  with  the  health  sector  expansion  using  immigrant 
skilled labour the expansion of the health service is the same: the size of the increase 
in skilled labour,  *
H H S -S , is the same as the importation of immigrant skilled labour, 
and the increase in the use of unskilled labour is again  *
H H U -U . This implies that the 
reductions in the waiting lists are the same, i.e.  *
W W S -S  and  *
W W U -U  in Figure 7 
equal  +
W W S -S  and  +
W W U -U  in Figure 6. The direct reductions in workers available to 
the  tradables  sectors  due  to  the  expansion  of  the  health  sector  are  *
H H S -S   and 
*
H H U -U .  However,  the  number  of  workers  on  the  waiting  list  falls,  so  that  the 
offsetting increases in the workers available to the tradables sectors are  *
W W S -S  and 
*
W W U -U .  
Figure 7: An expansion of the health sector using domestic workers 
 
                                                 
59   Note  that  if  wages  of  domestic  health-specific  workers  are  not  maintained  at  pre-immigration  levels,  the  numbers  of 
unskilled workers employed in the health sector vs. the tradables sectors and hence sectoral outputs depend on the elasticity 
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Whether the net change in the supply of workers to the tradables sectors is positive or 
negative again depends on the ‘efficiency’ of the health sector. In the case shown in 
Figure 7 the increase in the supply of skilled and unskilled workers due to successful 
treatment  is  lower  than  the  increase  in  the  employment  of  skilled  and  unskilled 
workers in the health sector, so that there is a net (and equiproportional) fall in the 
supply  of  workers  to  the  tradables  sectors,  and  thus  their  outputs  fall,  the  new 
equilibrium being at point d. If the health sector were sufficiently more efficient in 
treating both types of workers then the supply of workers to the tradables sectors 
would increase, and thus so would their outputs.
60 
Abandoning the simplifying assumption that the skill-intensity of the health sector is 
identical to skilled-unskilled national endowment ratio complicates the analysis, but 
reference to the standard Rybczynski results gives us some insight. For example, if the 
health sector is more skill-intensive than that assumed then an expansion of that sector 
will reduce the skilled-unskilled ratio of the workers available to the tradables sectors. 
This will reduce the size of the skill-intensive sector 1 and increase the size of the 
other sector relative to that shown in Figure 7. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model 
The full employment conditions for the two factors are 
  1 2 H E W S S S S S S + + = =     (4.1) 
  1 2 H E W U U U U U U + + = =     (4.2) 
where  E S  and  E U  are the effective endowments of skilled and unskilled labour. The 
amount  of  factor  k   used  in  producing  one  unit  of  output  in  sector  i,  ki a ,  is 
determined by the ratio of the given wages,  S w  for skilled labour,  U w  for unskilled 
labour. If the outputs of the three sectors are  i X ,  ,1,2 i H = , then we may write (4.1) 
and (4.2) as 
  1 1 2 2 SH H S S E W a X a X a X S S S   +   +   = =     (4.3) 
                                                 
60   There  is  an  increase  in  the  supply  of  skilled  (unskilled)  workers  to  the  tradables  sectors  if  * *
W H W H S +S S +S <  
( * *
W H W H U +U U +U < ).   29 
  1 1 2 2 UH H U U E W a X a X a X U U U   +   +   = =     (4.4) 
Total differentiation of (4.3) yields 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 SH H SH H S S S S E da X a dX da X a dX da X a dX dS   +   +   +   +   +   =  
Since the country is, by assumption, small  S w  and  U w  are exogenously determined, 
and thus so are factor intensities, so that  1 2 0 SH S S da da da = = = , implying 
  1 1 2 2 SH H S S E a dX a dX a dX dS   +   +   =   (4.5) 
which may be written as 
  1 2
1 1 2 2
1 2
H E
SH H S S E
H E
dX dX dX dS
a X a X a X S
X X X S
    +     +     =    
Dividing through by  E S  and writing the share of the effective endowment of skilled 
labour used in sector i as  1 Si Si E a X S   =   ,
61 and  ˆ
i i i X dX X =  then gives 
  1 1 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
SH H S S E X X X S         +   +   =   (4.6) 
Applying the same approach to unskilled labour gives 
  1 1 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
UH H U U E X X X U         +   +   =   (4.7) 
Suppose that the government finances the provision of health care via a lump-sum 
transfer,  T , from the representative household. The cost of health care provision is 
given by the product of the number of units of health delivered and the cost per unit: 
  H H T p X =     (4.8) 
where  H p  is determined by the unit cost of provision: 
  H S SH U UH p w a w a =   +     (4.9) 
A change in health care expenditure implies that  ˆ ˆ ˆH H T p X = + , but with exogenously 
determined wages  ˆ 0 H p =  so that  ˆ ˆ
H X T = . We can now rewrite (4.6) and (4.7) as 
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,1,2 1 Si i H  
= =      30 
  1 1 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
S S E SH X X S T         +   =       (4.10) 
  1 1 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
U U E UH X X U T         +   =       (4.11) 
Solving these gives 
  ( ) ( ) 1 2 2 2 2
ˆ 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ
U E S E UH S SH U
T
X S U            
   
=       +           (4.12) 
  ( ) ( ) 2 1 1 1 1
ˆ 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ
S E U E S UH SH U
T
X U S            
   
=                   (4.13) 
where  1 2 2 1 0 S U S U           =       >   under  the  assumption  that  sector  1  is  skill-
intensive relative to sector 2.  
Changes in the health budget will lead to changes in the waiting list for skilled labour 
and  thus  in  its  effective  (able  to  work)  endowment.  Since  E W S S S =     and  the 
overall skill endowment is fixed ( 0 dS = ) we have  E W dS dS =    as a consequence of 
a change in health output of  H dX , i.e. 
 
W W H H
E H W
H H W H
S S X dX
dS dX S
X X S X
       
=     =                      
where the term in parentheses is the elasticity of the skilled labour waiting list with 
respect  to  health  output,  S
H   .  Dividing  though  by  E S   allows  us  to  write  the 
proportionate change  ˆ
E S  as 
  ˆ ˆ S
E H SW H S X     =       (4.14) 
where  0 SW W E S S   = >   is  the  ratio  of  skilled  labour  on  the  waiting  list  to  the 
effective skilled labour  endowment, which may be interpreted  as the ‘dependency 
ratio’ for skilled labour. 
Similarly  we  may  write  the  proportionate  change  in  the  effective  endowment  of 
unskilled labour following a change in health output as 
  ˆ ˆ U
E H UW H U X     =       (4.15)   31 
where  S
H    is the elasticity of the unskilled labour waiting list with respect to health 
output  and  0 UW W E U U   = >   is  the  ‘dependency  ratio’  for  unskilled  labour. 
Remembering that  ˆ ˆ
H X T =  we may rewrite (4.12) and (4.13) as 
 
( ) 1 2 2 2 2
ˆ
ˆ S U
U H SW S H UW UH S SH U
T
X                    
 
=           +        
  (4.16) 
  ( ) 2 1 1 1 1
ˆ
ˆ U S
S H UW U H SW S UH SH U
T
X                    
 
=               +       (4.17) 
There are many possible combinations of the factor intensities  ki   , the waiting list 
elasticities  k
H     and  the  dependency  ratios  kW   .  For  simplicity  we  focus  on  the 
outcome when skilled and unskilled labour are homogenous in health status in that 
S U
H H       = =  and  SW UW       = = , so that (4.16) and (4.17) become 
  ( ) ( ) 1 2 2 2 2
ˆ
ˆ
U S UH S SH U
T
X                
 
=       +                   (4.18) 
  ( ) ( ) 2 1 1 1 1
ˆ
ˆ
S U S UH SH U
T
X                
 
=                           (4.19) 
The first terms in these expressions represent the scale effects of the expansion of the 
health sector, which depend directly on factor intensities in the tradables sectors. 





X        
 
=           (4.20) 





X        
 
=           (4.21) 
If  sector  1  has  a  skilled/unskilled  ratio  that  is  higher  than  the  skilled/unskilled 
effective endowment ratio then  1 1 S U     > , while if sector 2 has a skilled/unskilled 
ratio  that  is  lower  than  the  skilled/unskilled  effective  endowment  ratio  then 
2 2 S U     < .
62 In that case  1 ˆ 0 S X >  and  2 ˆ 0 S X > . (Note that at least one of the three 
sectors  must  have  a  skilled/unskilled  ratio  that  is  higher  (lower)  than  the 
skilled/unskilled effective endowment ratio.) 
                                                 
62   For example, 1 1 1 1 1 1 E E E E S U S U S U S S U U     >   >   >    32 
The second terms represent the factor bias effects: 
  ( ) 1 2 2
ˆ
ˆ F
UH S SH U
T
X        
 
=           (4.22) 
  ( ) 2 1 1
ˆ
ˆ F
SH U S UH
T
X        
 
=           (4.23) 
Here the differences in factor intensities between the health sector and the identified 
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=            
   
  (4.25) 
If  2 2 SH UH S U         > , i.e. the health sector is more skill-intensive than tradables 
sector 2, then the factor bias effect will decrease the output of tradables sector 1, and 
conversely, while if  1 1 SH UH S U         > , i.e. the health sector is more skill-intensive 
than tradables sector 1, then the factor bias effect will increase the output of tradables 
sector 2. (N.B. by assumption sector 1 is more skill-intensive than tradables sector 2.)   33 
Table 8: Scale and factor bias effects in the tradables sectors 
















1 2 H E s s s s > > >
1  1 ˆ 0
S X >   1 ˆ 0
F X <   +/-  2 ˆ 0
S X <   2 ˆ 0
F X >   -/+ 
1 2 H E s s s s > > >   1 ˆ 0
S X >   1 ˆ 0
F X <   +/-  2 ˆ 0
S X >   2 ˆ 0
F X >   2 ˆ 0 X >  
1 2 E H s s s s > > >   1 ˆ 0
S X >   1 ˆ 0
F X <   +/-  2 ˆ 0
S X >   2 ˆ 0
F X <   -/+ 
1 2 H E s s s s > > >   1 ˆ 0
S X >   1 ˆ 0
F X <   +/-  2 ˆ 0
S X >   2 ˆ 0
F X <   -/+ 
1 2 E H s s s s > > >   1 ˆ 0
S X >   1 ˆ 0
F X >   1 ˆ 0 X >   2 ˆ 0
S X >   2 ˆ 0
F X <   -/+ 
1 2 E H s s s s > > >   1 ˆ 0
S X <   1 ˆ 0
F X >   -/+  2 ˆ 0
S X >   2 ˆ 0
F X <   +/- 
1 where  j j j s S U =  for  1,2, , j H E =     
The net effect of the factor bias and scale effects in the HOS model with a non-
tradable health sector on which endowments are endogenously modelled, depends on 
the sign and relative size of the factor bias and scale effects. Table 8 shows that the 
net  effects  are  generally  indeterminate  depending  on  the  factor  intensity  rankings. 
This is where the values of      and     come in. For these indeterminate cases the 
following ‘rule’ can be discerned: for         ‘small enough’, i.e. the health sector is 
relatively  inefficient  in  treating  and  curing  sick  workers,  factor  bias  effects  will 
prevail.  Otherwise,  scale  effects  will  dominate.
63  The  former  is  likely  to  hold  for 
developed  countries  since  health  systems  of  these  countries  are  generally  well-
developed and the marginal impact of an increase in the health budget is likely to be 
small. The latter is likely to hold for many developing countries, since health systems 
of many of these countries are underdeveloped and still do not reach the majority of 
(poor) people. 
                                                 
63   For an illustration of all possible combinations of relative output changes for the first two cases displayed in Table 8 see 
Rutten (2004).   34 
Furthermore, all cases shown in Table 8 are representative of the long-term, since 
skilled  and  unskilled  workers  are  fully  mobile.  Introducing  health-specific  skilled 
workers  further  complicates  the  analysis  by  introducing  separate  effective 
endowments, waiting lists and wages for health-specific and other skilled workers 
respectively.  The  added  complexities  obscure  the  derivation  of  the  Rybczynski 
theorem (where the health sector expansion would be driven by an increase in the use 
of domestic unskilled workers) and the derivation of the impacts of the importation of 
health-specific skilled workers.
64  
Specifically,  the  prices  of  health  care  and  health-specific  skilled  workers  become 
endogenous  and  three  additional  parameters  appear  in  the  solution  values  for  the 
proportionate output changes of the tradables sectors: the cost share of health-specific 
skilled workers, the elasticity of substitution between health-specific skilled workers 
and  unskilled  workers  in  the  health  sector,  and  the  ratio  of  unskilled  workers 
employed in the health sector to unskilled workers employed in the tradables sectors. 
The latter parameter appears as, due to the sector-specificity of skilled workers, the 
tradables sectors now compete with the non-tradable health sector only in terms of 
unskilled workers.  
Consequently, and in the spirit of the Specific Factors model, an expansion of the 
health sector initially reduces the supply of unskilled workers remaining for tradables, 
so that, on the basis of the Rybczynski theorem, the output of the unskilled-intensive 
good (sector 2) falls and the output of the other good (sector 1) rises (factor bias 
effects).  An  assessment  of  the  net  effect,  i.e.  including  scale  effects,  is  not  so 
straightforward since the aforementioned parameters cloud the analysis. It is therefore 
not possible to derive a generic ‘rule’ or generic ‘rules’ for the proportionate changes 
in the outputs of tradables following from an increase in the use of domestic unskilled 
workers in the health sector in a model more representative of the short-term. The 
same  is  true  for  the  derivation  of  the  impacts  of  using  immigrant  health-specific 
skilled workers in the domestic health sector. Combined with the lack of real-life 
complexities  (such  as  more  sectors,  factors  of  production  and  households,  a  tax-
charging  and  transfer-  and  public  good-providing  government,  intermediate  inputs 
                                                 
64   This is not within the scope of this paper. See Rutten (2004).   35 
and welfare gains from health sector provisioning) this provides a strong argument for 
the use of an applied general equilibrium model.  
Welfare changes  
Welfare changes are derived for those in employment and of the total population as a 
whole (including those not able to work due to ill health), using per capita income as a 
welfare measure.  
In the initial equilibrium per capita income,  I , of the working population (denoted 
byE ) is: 
  S E U E
E
E E






  (4.26) 
where  E S  and  E U  denote effective, i.e. able to work, endowments of skilled and 
unskilled workers respectively.
65  
Total differentiation of equation (4.26), given that 0 S U dw dw = = , yields: 
  S E U E E E
E E
S E U E E E
w dS w dU dS dU
dI I
w S w U S U
    + +
=       + +    
  (4.27) 
so  that  the  proportionate  change  in  per  capita  income  of  the  working  population 
equals: 
  
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ S E E U E E E E E E
E
S E U E E E
w S S w U U S S U U
I
w S w U S U
    + +
=           + +    
  (4.28) 
After further manipulation equation (4.28) yields: 
  ( )( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ
E E E I S U     =       (4.29) 
where  ( ) S E S E U E w S w S w U   = +  denotes the share of skilled workers in the total 
income of the working population and  ( ) E E E S S U   = +  denotes the share of skilled 
workers in total effective labour supply. 
                                                 
65   Throughout the analysis it is assumed that all those able to work are in employment.   36 
Developing the expression for        yields: 
  ( )
( )( )
S U E E
S E U E E E
w w S U
w S w U S U




  (4.30) 
which is positive assuming that  S U w w > , i.e. skilled workers earn a higher wage 
relative to unskilled workers. 
From (4.29), if the health sector is equally efficient in treating and curing skilled and 
unskilled workers, i.e.  ˆ ˆ 0 E E S U = > , per capita income of the working population is 
not affected. Additionally, if the health sector is more efficient in treating and curing 
skilled (unskilled) workers relative to unskilled (skilled) workers, i.e.  ˆ ˆ 0 E E S U > >  
( ˆ ˆ 0 E E U S > > ), per capita income of the working population will rise (fall). Thus if 
the  government  is  solely  concerned  with  maximising  per  capita  income  of  the 
working population and sets aside considerations of fairness and well-being, equation 
(4.29) provides a, rather perverse, argument for targeting government health policy in 
terms of the provision and quality of treatments to skilled workers only (or worse, to 
deteriorate the health of the unskilled). 
66 
In the initial equilibrium per capita income of the total population, working and not 
working, is  






  (4.31) 
Total differentiation of equation (4.31) yields: 






  (4.32) 
so that the proportionate change in per capita income of the population can be derived 
as: 
  ( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 E E E E E I S U S U U       = +   =   +   (4.33) 
                                                 
66   Note that substituting for effective labour supplies using (4.14) and (4.15) only complicates equation (4.29) and does not add 
any ‘explanatory power’. This is therefore not done.   37 
Given that the total population does not change (S and  U  are exogenous),  ˆ I also 
represents the proportionate change in total income or GDP and, in the absence of 
intermediate inputs, the proportionate change in the total value of output at world 
prices. 
From equation (4.33) an improvement in health for both worker types,  ˆ 0 E S >  and 
ˆ 0 E U > , generates an increase  in per  capita income of the population  even if the 
health sector is equally efficient in treating and curing skilled and unskilled workers 
(i.e.  ˆ ˆ 0 E E S U = > ).  Nevertheless,  for  a  given  level  of  health  improvement  of  the 
unskilled,  ˆ 0 E U > ,  the  increase  in  per  capita  income  will  be  higher  the  more  the 
health  of  skilled  workers  is  improved  relative  to  the  health  of  unskilled  workers. 
Hence, if the government’s prime objective is to maximise per capita income of the 
total  population  and  sets  aside  considerations  of  equity  and  well-being,  equation 
(4.33)  suggests  a,  still  rather  perverse,  policy  predicament  of  targeting  treatments 
towards all skill types, but relatively more to skilled workers.  
The  above  situation  is  illustrative  for  the  long-term.  The  introduction  of  health-
specific  skilled  workers  to  make  the  model  representative  for  the  short-term,  as 
before,  complicates  the  analysis  significantly.  The  sign  of  the  changes  in  the  per 
capita income of the working population and the total population is undetermined so 
that no predictions can be made with respect to these variables when the health sector 
expansion is accommodated by an increase in unskilled labour only, let alone by an 
increase in the import of health-specific skilled workers. However, if we abstract from 
the  fact  that  the  health  sector  treats  and  cures  ill  workers,  the  per  capita  income 
changes of the working and the total population have the same sign as that of the 
change in the wage of health-specific skilled labour, which is negative in the case of 
recruitment of health-specific workers from abroad and positive in case of using more 
of (domestic) unskilled workers only.  
A  final  consideration  which  plays  a  key  role  in  the  determination  of  the  welfare 
effects is that throughout the analysis it has been assumed that health solely affects 
income, via its impact on labour market participation. Were we to allow for changes 
in well-being, i.e. utility gains from improved health following an expansion of the 
health  sector,  any  of  the  observed  welfare  losses  become  less  and  if  they  weigh   38 
relatively heavily in the welfare calculations could turn into welfare gains. These and 
other  real-life  complexities,  such  as  remittance  behaviour  of  migrant  workers,  are 
accounted for in the comparative static CGE model of the UK economy discussed in 
the next section. 
5. Model simulations and results: reducing rationing in UK health care 
The model used in this study is a comparative static CGE model of the UK economy. 
The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) underlying the model has been constructed by 
augmenting the UK Input-Output Supply and Use Tables for 2000, using data from 
the  General  Household  Survey  (GHS)  for  2000-01.  The  CGE  model  has  in  most 
respects a standard structure, the novelty coming from the explicit modelling of the 
health sector, comprising public (NHS) and private health care, and its interaction 
with the rest of the economy through its differential impact across sectors, factors and 
household  types  (specified  in  Table  9).  An  outline  of  the  model  is  given  in  the 
appendix, with special detail on health and welfare effects.
 67 
Table 9: The CGE model classifications 
FACTORS OF PRODUCTION (f)  HOUSEHOLDS (h) 
Skill  Skilled  Hse1  Pensioners 
Unsk  Unskilled  Hse2  Non-working, children 
Cap  Capital  Hse3  Non-working, no children 
Hse4  Working, children   
Hse5  Working, no children 
SECTORS (i) / COMMODITIES (j) 
1.  Primary  7.  Distribution & transport 
2.  Pharmaceuticals  8.  Finance 
3.  Medical instruments  9.  Public administration & defence 
4.  Other manufacturing  10. Health care 
5.  Energy  11. Other services 
6.  Construction   
 
                                                 
67   For more detail on the model and the data see Rutten (2004).   39 
Setting up the model experiments 
We  employ  the  model  in  two  types  of  experiments,  both  targeted  at  alleviating 
rationing  in  UK  health  care  and  both  observed  in  reality.  Firstly  we  examine  the 
impact  of  importing  medical  services  from  abroad,  i.e.  skilled  health  personnel, 
consisting of doctors and nurses (experiment 1). On entering the UK foreign doctors 
and nurses are assumed to become part of the existing domestic household structure, 
i.e. they are perfect substitutes for their domestic equivalents. This assumption takes 
into account that, in the long-term, many of them are planning to stay and will thus 
become permanent UK households. Furthermore, their wages are maintained at pre-
immigration levels so that domestic workers are not worse off as a consequence of the 
policy. This is a realistic assumption given that wages of health workers in the UK are 
essentially  fixed  in  bilateral  bargaining  rounds  between  the  Department  of  Health 
(constrained  by  the  Treasury)  and  the  medical  profession  (represented  by,  among 
others, the British Medical Association).
68 However, in order to illustrate the welfare 
implications of wage protection of the medical profession, we subsequently consider 
the impact of allowing the wage of migrant health workers to fall. The experiment is 
carried out using three alternative assumptions regarding the share of foreign worker 
income  remitted  abroad,  adopting  illustrative  values  of  0%,  50%  and  100% 
respectively.  Varying  the  share  of  migrant  income  remitted  will  have  differential 
welfare implications since remittances have to be compensated for by a rise in exports 
and/or a fall in imports so as to maintain the balance of payments. 
Secondly,  we  consider  the  alternative  policy  of  increasing  government  health 
expenditures, so that not only more doctors and nurses, but also more of other skilled 
workers  (technicians,  managers),  unskilled  workers  (hospital  ward  assistants, 
ambulance staff,  ancillary workers),  capital (electronic machinery, land, buildings) 
and  intermediate  inputs  (pharmaceuticals  and  medical  instruments)  can  be  bought 
(Experiment 2).  
For the purpose of comparability, we carry out the two experiments so that they will 
have identical implications for the nominal government budget on health care (i.e. the 
                                                 
68   In such an environment the medical profession does simply not accept a wage decline resulting from the import of foreign 
health workers.    40 
NHS budget). In experiment 1, it is assumed that an equivalent of 10% of the current 
domestic endowments of doctors and nurses takes up the chance to migrate to the UK, 
so that the NHS budget has to rise by 12.8% (approximately £6.9 billion) to maintain 
their  wages  at  the  pre-immigration  levels  in  the  UK  health  sector.  This  budget 
increase is taken as the point of departure for experiment 2.
69 
Since we expect that alleviating the shortage of health personnel and medical services 
in general – as evident from, for example, long waiting lists and, relative to other 
OECD countries, poor health outcomes in some areas – will entail significant health 
benefits  to  the  population  of  the  UK,  we  run  the  experiments  in  the  presence  of 
(positive)  health  effects.  The  effects  on  welfare  of  higher  health  provision  come 
through two main channels: (a) the direct gain from increasing the “well-being” of the 
population, and (b) the indirect effects of an increase in the size of the effective (i.e. 
“able to work”) endowments of skilled and unskilled labour for use in non-health 
activities. As best and rather conservative estimates of the indirect health effects, we 
use elasticity values of 0.06 and 0.09 for skilled and unskilled labour respectively, so 
that a doubling in their health status (following from a rise in NHS and/or private 
health care provisioning) will lead to a rise in the effective endowments of skilled and 
unskilled labour of 6% and 9% respectively.
70  
Before  we  run  the  model  experiments,  we  adjust  the  model  specification  (as 
summarised  in  the  appendix)  to  account  for  the  fact  that  doctors  and  nurses  are 
highly-skilled and specific to the health sector, and therefore immobile in the short-
run.
71 Doctors and nurses account for approximately 85% of skilled labour employed 
in health care and earn a fixed wage, whereas the remaining 15% of skilled labour in 
the model remains mobile and earn a market-clearing wage.  
                                                 
69   Note that the two policy experiments will differ in terms of their real budgetary impact due to differential price effects. In 
addition, in a setup where, given the NHS budget, wages of doctors and nurses are allowed to fall following immigration, the 
comparability with a generic NHS budget increase logically breaks down, immigration being essentially costless since the 
NHS budget does not have to increase to accommodate an increase in NHS provision levels. 
70   The indirect health effect is higher for unskilled labour due to the fact that a relatively higher proportion of the unskilled 
suffer illness, so that the health expenditure’s “leverage” is greater for this labour type. See the appendix. 
71   This is arguably less or not the case for other health personnel such as managers and ancillary workers. Note that health 
effects differ for skilled and unskilled labour but are the same across doctors, nurses and other mobile skilled labour types.   41 
Experiment 1: importing doctors and nurses at the current wage 
In the absence of remittances abroad the specified rise in the NHS budget (of 12.8%), 
which  is  targeted  towards  the  immigration  of  foreign  health  care-specific  skilled 
workers, yields a rise in real levels of NHS provisioning of approximately the same 
amount. The demand for and the domestic production of pharmaceutical products and 
medical instruments increase by 6.4% and 2.7% respectively. While the wages of the 
domestic and foreign workers of the aforementioned types are sustained at benchmark 
levels, the costs of intermediate inputs of pharmaceuticals, rents on capital, and so 
unit costs of health care rise slightly so that private health care contracts (by 0.3%). 
The increase in public health care boosts both the health and its participation in the 
labour market of unskilled labour relative to skilled labour (12.2% relative to 10.5% 
and 0.9% relative to 0.5% respectively), as unskilled labour is affected primarily by 
changes in public health care provision, whereas the skilled labour is also affected by 
changes in private health care provision, which is now more costly and less available.  
The  changes  in  (effective)  factor  supplies  and  sectoral  factor  demands  result  in  a 
(minor) fall in wages of mobile skilled and unskilled labour, whereas capital rents rise 
slightly. Despite this fall in wages, the increase in labour market participation ensures 
that all households’ income from labour rises. Although government income from tax 
revenue rises, the NHS budget expands by more so that the government has to reduce 
state benefits to households (by 4.8%). Taking into account that the increase in NHS 
provisioning  (and  other  public  goods)  in  itself  constitutes  a  welfare  gain,  the 
expansion  yields  welfare  gains  for  all  households  except  pensioners,  who  lose  by 
0.3%. Non-working households with and without children gain by 0.2% and 0.1% 
respectively, whereas working households with and without children gain by 0.8% 
and 1.1% respectively. In total, welfare rises by £5.678 billion (a gain of 0.6% relative 
to the original level of welfare).  
Accounting  for  remittances  abroad  reduces  (increases)  the  previously  observed 
income and welfare gains (losses) for households so that overall welfare gains fall to a 
level of £4.733 billion (0.5% in relative terms) and £3.787 (0.4% in relative terms) 
respectively when 50% or 100% of migrant income is remitted.   42 
If  the  government  does  not  maintain  the  wages  of  doctors  and  nurses  at  pre-
immigration  levels,  NHS  (and  private  health  care)  provision  levels  increase  by 
approximately 4.4% at the given NHS budget and in the absence of remittances. This 
is made possible by a fall in wages of doctors and nurses of 12.8%, yielding a fall in 
unit costs of health provisioning by approximately 4.2%.
72 Despite the fall in wages, 
the increase in labour  market participation ensures that, with the exception of the 
original domestic doctors and nurses in the UK, the income of all households from 
labour rises. Government transfers to households in the form of state benefits now 
also increase given the rise in government tax revenues, since NHS provision levels 
expand  by  less.  Consequently,  all  households  experience  welfare  gains,  with 
pensioners and non-working households now benefiting relatively more compared to 
the working households (gains in the range of 0.5%-1% for the former compared to 
0.3%-0.4% for the latter). In total, welfare rises by £3.892 billion in the absence of 
remittances (a gain of 0.4% in relative terms), which is less than if the government 
would protect the wages of doctors and nurses. This counterintuitive result can be 
explained from the fact that NHS provision levels expand by less if wages of doctors 
and nurses are not sustained, yielding lower indirect welfare gains from increased 
effective,  i.e.  “able  to  work”,  labour  endowments.
73  Hence,  in  a  second  best 
environment in which health care provision is rationed at too low a level from a social 
welfare point of view, wage protection following the immigration of foreign health 
workers is welfare-improving. 
The changes in household and overall welfare are shown in Table 10 and Figure 8 for 
each of the remittance and wage scenarios.  
Experiment 2: a generic increase in the NHS budget 
A 12.8% increase in the NHS budget leads to a rise in real levels of NHS provisioning 
of only 8% and, via input-output linkages, increases the demand for and domestic 
production of pharmaceutical products and medical instruments by 3.8% and 1.6% 
respectively. The remainder of the NHS budget is spent on higher wages of doctors 
                                                 
72   Slight differences in percentage changes can be explained from rounding errors. 
73    If indirect welfare effects from improved health on effective labour supplies would be absent, overall welfare gains are 
actually higher (by £333 million or 0.04% in the absence of remittances).   43 
and nurses, showing increases of 13.3%, which results in higher unit costs and hence a 
contraction in private care of 4.5%.
74  
As before, the increase in public health care improves the health and participation in 
the labour market of unskilled labour relative to skilled labour (7.4% relative to 5.8% 
and  0.6%  relative  to  0.3%  respectively),  as  the  former  is  affected  primarily  by 
changes in public health care, whereas the latter also responds to changes in private 
health care provision, which is more costly and less available.  
Again, the changes in (effective) factor supplies and sectoral factor demands result in 
a (minor) fall in wages of mobile skilled and unskilled labour, whereas capital rents 
rise slightly. Despite this fall in wages, the increase in labour market participation 
ensures that the income from labour rises for all households.  
While experiments 1 and 2 have equal nominal NHS budget implications (assuming 
that in the former the wages of doctors and nurses are maintained at pre-immigration 
levels), the income from state benefits fall by relatively more (5.3%) compared to 
experiment  1  since  government  tax  revenue  is  lower.  Consequently,  household 
welfare falls for pensioners and non-working households (in the range of 0.6% to 
0.9%) and rises for working households (in the range of 0.4% to 0.8%). In total, 
welfare increases by £1.770 billion (a gain of 0.2% relative to the original level of 
welfare).  
The total welfare gains are lower than those observed in experiment 1, even when 
migrant workers remit all income. This result can be explained as a consequence of 
the  immigration  of  doctors  and  nurses  in  the  first  experiment  addressing  the 
bottleneck of the scarcity of this type of labour in the UK, while increasing the NHS 
budget in the second experiment aggravates it (by putting upward pressure on the 
wages of doctors and nurses). 
                                                 
74   Note that if all skilled labour was perfectly mobile, NHS production would increase by 12.8% and private health care would 
contract only slightly, by 0.4%. Total welfare would increase by £3.033 billion, a relative gain of 0.3%. The presence of 
health care-specific skilled labour thus constrains the production expansion of health care and related sectors, the health of 
the population and effective labour supplies and so yields lower overall welfare gains, cutting total welfare gains by 42%.    44 




HSE1 HSE2 HSE3 HSE4 HSE5 Overall
0% Millions £ -572 47 50 2211 3942 5678
% -0.27 0.18 0.11 0.75 1.07 0.60
50% Millions £ -695 32 31 1906 3459 4733
% -0.33 0.12 0.07 0.65 0.94 0.50
100% Millions £ -818 16 12 1602 2975 3787
% -0.38 0.06 0.03 0.55 0.81 0.40
0% Millions £ 1127 262 309 1164 1030 3892
% 0.53 0.98 0.68 0.40 0.28 0.41
50% Millions £ 1023 249 293 896 602 3064
% 0.48 0.93 0.64 0.31 0.16 0.32
100% Millions £ 920 237 278 629 174 2236
% 0.43 0.88 0.61 0.21 0.05 0.24
Millions £ -1710 -228 -266 1042 2932 1770
% -0.80 -0.85 -0.58 0.36 0.79 0.19
1. 10% immigration of 
doctors and nurses at 
current wage (12.8% 
increase in NHS budget)
1. 10% immigration of 
doctors and nurses at 
current NHS budget 
(wages fall by 12.8%)
2. Generic rise in NHS budget (12.8%)
 
Figure 8: Changes in household welfare 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
Sensitivity analyses for the elasticities of substitution and transformation show that 
the  results  of  the  counterfactual  simulations  are  relatively  robust:  although  sign 
changes do occur for some variables, the impact of changing the respective elasticities 
upon overall welfare is negligible.  
Varying  the  health  elasticities  for  skilled  and  unskilled  labour,  which  govern  the 
indirect health effects of improved health on effective labour supplies, does however 
affect the results considerably: generally, in the presence of increasingly strong health 
effects  for  both  skilled  and  unskilled  labour,  the  expansion  of  NHS  care,  while 
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long-run  through  increases  in  effective  labour  supply  and  production,  and  by 
enhancing the tax revenue of the government, which in turn benefits both working 
households (in terms of their wage income) and non-working households (in terms of 
their receipt of state benefits).  
Table 11 and Figure 9 report the results of our experiments when we double the health 
elasticities for skilled and unskilled labour. Comparison with Table 10 and Figure 8 
reveals that, given the incidence of illness, if the health sector is twice as efficient in 
‘producing’ healthy workers, overall welfare gains increase in the range of 60% to 
90% for immigration at the current wage, in the range of 40% to 70% for immigration 
at the current NHS budget, and by 110% for a generic increase of the NHS budget. 
Further, apart from the latter policy experiment, all households now benefit from the 
policies implemented. 






HSE1 HSE2 HSE3 HSE4 HSE5 Overall
0% Millions £ 330 162 239 3180 5086 8997
% 0.15 0.61 0.52 1.09 1.38 0.95
50% Millions £ 209 147 221 2877 4604 8058
% 0.10 0.55 0.48 0.98 1.25 0.85
100% Millions £ 88 132 202 2574 4121 7117
% 0.04 0.49 0.44 0.88 1.12 0.75
0% Millions £ 1611 324 409 1622 1534 5499
% 0.76 1.21 0.89 0.55 0.42 0.58
50% Millions £ 1511 311 394 1358 1110 4685
% 0.71 1.16 0.86 0.46 0.30 0.49
100% Millions £ 1412 299 378 1094 686 3870
% 0.66 1.12 0.83 0.37 0.19 0.41
Millions £ -1060 -146 -133 1652 3604 3917
% -0.50 -0.55 -0.29 0.56 0.98 0.41
1. 10% immigration of 
doctors and nurses at 
current wage (12.8% 
increase in NHS budget)
1. 10% immigration of 
doctors and nurses at 
current NHS budget 
(wages fall by 12.8%)
2. Generic rise in NHS budget (12.8%)
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Figure 9 Changes in household welfare if health sector is twice as efficient 
 
These results suggest that if we were to employ the model for a different country then 
we could get quite different  results, depending on the incidence of illness (which 
determines the number of people treated by the health sector and so the number of 
healthy workers that could be produced) and the ‘efficiency’ of the health sector in 
producing healthy workers.  
At the lower end, welfare gains are guaranteed in experiment 1, even in the absence of 
health effects,
75 whereas in experiment two welfare rises for relatively low values of 
the  health  elasticities  (of  around  0.01  to  0.02  for  skilled  and  unskilled  labour 
respectively), so that the main results continue to hold.  
                                                 
75   Exception:  if  wages  of  doctors  and  nurses  are  sustained  and  all  migrant  income  is  remitted  abroad,  a  slight  (0.003%) 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper seeks to determine the macro-economic impacts of migration of skilled 
medical  personnel  from  a  receiving  country’s  perspective,  taking  the  UK  as  an 
archetype OECD economy that imports medical services.  
The contributions of the paper to the existing literature on medical migration are three 
fold. Firstly, we present evidence regarding migration flows of health workers into the 
UK  and  other  countries,  and  migration  policies  that  may  be  of  influence,  in  a 
comprehensive manner. Secondly, we use some simple general equilibrium theory to 
study the effects of an expansion of the health sector, in the long-term driven by an 
increase in the use of domestic skilled and unskilled labour, and in the short-term 
driven either by an increase in the use of unskilled labour only, or also by imports of 
foreign medical skilled workers, since skilled workers in the health sector have health-
specific skills that are not easily transferable. The novelty here comes from the use of 
an approach based on that commonly used in the explanation of ‘Rybczynski effects’ 
in  the  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  model,  but  now  following  changes  in  factor 
endowments which are endogenously determined by government provision of health 
care. Finally, we use a static CGE model for the UK, which is able to capture the 
simultaneous effects of changes in health on effective labour supplies and resource 
claims made by the health care sector following a change in health provision in two 
types of policy experiments. Specifically, the policies of importing medical services 
of foreign skilled workers (doctors and nurses)  at the current wage and a generic 
increase in the NHS budget are contrasted with each other, assuming that doctors and 
nurses  are  immobile,  i.e.  specific  to  the  health  sector,  and,  for  the  purpose  of 
comparability, that the policies have identical nominal NHS budget implications. In 
order to illustrate the social welfare implications of wage protection of the medical 
profession following immigration we also report results of the immigration policy 
whilst allowing wages of doctors and nurses to fall. 
Key findings are that, while the total number of doctors and nurses from overseas has 
risen dramatically over the last decade, since 2003 total new entries from overseas 
into the UK are falling, only partially compensated by a rise in entries from the EEA 
and  UK-trained  personnel.  Nevertheless,  still  1  in  3  doctors  comes  from  abroad   48 
(mostly  from  regions  other  than  the  EEA  and  Africa)  and  approximately  1  in  10 
nurses (popular source countries are India, Philippines, Australia and South Africa). 
The inflow of doctors is relatively large compared to the inflow of nurses when taking 
into account present “stocks”, which, supported by evidence of nurses taking over 
some  of  the  responsibilities  of  doctors,  suggests  that  doctors  in  the  UK  are  in 
relatively short supply. Relative to the US, the UK is an important recruiter of nurses 
worldwide, especially when accounting for their size-difference.  
While the slowdown in overseas medical migration could be a consequence of the 
UK’s Code of Practice, we expect international medical migration to be facilitated by 
progress in GATS Mode 4 negotiations.  
From a diagrammatic analysis, the impact of an expanding health sector using only 
unskilled workers available in the short-run, and assuming homogeneity in illness and 
health  and  a  skill-intensity  of  the  health  sector  identical  to  the  skilled-unskilled 
national endowment ratio, yields a rise in the output of the skill-intensive good, and a 
fall in output of the unskilled-intensive good unless the health sector is very ‘efficient’ 
in treating and curing workers. The alternative short-term method of expanding the 
health sector by recruiting foreign workers with health-specific skills, assuming that 
they are paid the same wage and assuming an identical increase in employment of 
unskilled workers in the health sector as in the previous case, increases outputs of the 
two tradables sectors by more and thus compares favourably. Would the government 
be able to recruit health-specific skilled workers on the domestic market, i.e. in the 
long-run, the supply of workers to the tradables sectors and hence their outputs fall or 
rise  depending  on  the  efficiency  of  the  health  sector  in  treating  and  curing  sick 
workers. In this context, a more skill-intensive health sector will reduce the size of the 
skill-intensive sector and increase the size of the other sector. 
From a formal derivation of the Rybczynski theorem, the impact of an expanding 
health sector on the outputs of non-health sectors is more generally shown to depend 
on the sign and magnitude of the scale effects of increased effective labour supplies 
and factor-bias effects of changes in the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour. The net 
effects are generally indeterminate in that they depend on the factor intensity rankings 
and  the  ‘efficiency’  of  the  health  sector  in  treating  and  curing  sick  workers.   49 
Nonetheless, as a general ‘rule’ the factor bias effects are shown to dominate if the 
health sector is relatively inefficient in treating and curing people. Such a situation is 
likely to hold for relatively well-developed health systems, such as that of the UK and 
other developed countries.  
It is not possible to derive a generic ‘rule’ or generic ‘rules’ for the net effects on 
outputs of tradables in a model more representative of the short-term (i.e. accounting 
for health-specific skilled workers), where an expansion of the health sector can only 
be accommodated by either an increase in the use of domestic unskilled workers or an 
increase  in  the  use  of  imported  health-specific  skilled  workers  (and  unskilled 
workers). If one focuses on factor bias effects only, an expansion of the health sector 
made possible by an increase in the use of unskilled workers yields a contraction of 
the unskilled-intensive sector and an expansion of the other sector, since the health 
sector competes with the tradables sectors only in terms unskilled labour.  
Similar findings hold for the derivation of the changes in welfare, using per capita 
income of the working and of the total population as welfare measures. In the long-
run and setting aside considerations of equity (fairness) and well-being from improved 
health,  both  indicators  favour  a  government  policy  of  targeting  the  provision  and 
quality of treatments relatively more towards skilled workers. The introduction of 
health-specific skilled workers to make the model representative of the short-term 
makes changes in the welfare measures unpredictable. However, if we abstract from 
the  fact  that  the  health  sector  treats  and  cures  ill  workers,  the  per  capita  income 
changes of the working and the total population have the same sign as that of the 
change in the wage of health-specific skilled labour, which is negative in the case of 
recruitment of health-specific workers from abroad and positive in case of using more 
of (domestic) unskilled workers only. However, if changes in well-being, i.e. utility 
gains from improved health are accounted for, any of the observed welfare losses 
become less and could turn into welfare gains depending on their relative weight in 
the welfare measure(s) used. 
The theory is useful in that it shows the effects operating in the background. It thereby 
enables  us  to  interpret  the  impacts  of  changes  in  the  provision  of  health  care. 
Nonetheless, the introduction of characteristics more truthful to reality such as the   50 
health-specificity  of  skills  used  by  workers  in  the  health  sector  renders  outcomes 
rather unpredictable. This motivates the use of an applied general equilibrium model, 
which  is  also  able  to  accommodate  other  real-life  complexities,  including  more 
sectors, factors and households, a tax-charging, transfer- and public good-providing 
government, intermediate inputs and welfare gains from public goods. 
On the whole, empirical evidence suggests that the benefits of saving on training costs 
and tax contributions seems to outweigh costs of social security, unemployment and 
(small) declines in wages so that migration benefits the industrialised countries such 
as the UK. This is substantiated by our CGE model results.  
Specifically, importing medical services of foreign doctors and nurses yields higher 
overall welfare gains compared to a generic increase in the NHS budget, even if all 
foreign worker income is (hypothetically) remitted abroad, since the former policy 
results in higher government tax revenues. The immigration of doctors and nurses 
addresses  the  bottleneck  of  the  scarcity  of  this  type  of  labour  in  the  UK,  while 
increasing the NHS budget generically aggravates it (by putting upward pressure on 
the wages of doctors and nurses).  
Surprisingly, the protection of wages of doctors and nurses in the UK following an 
influx of foreign workers yields higher welfare gains compared to a situation where 
wages  would be allowed to fall.  This is exemplary of a second best  environment 
created by a rationed health care system such as that of the UK, in which the size of 
the health sector is too small from a social welfare point of view due to the presence 
of positive externalities. 
In  all  experiments  the  increase  in  the  NHS  provision  levels,  while  drawing  away 
resources from other non-health related sectors and its private counterpart, yields an 
overall welfare gain, indirectly through increased worker incomes and directly via 
increases in population well-being. The sensitivity analyses show that these overall 
welfare  gains  are  guaranteed,  even  if  the  effects  of  improved  health  on  effective 
labour  supplies  are  very  weak,  and  rise  with  increasingly  strong  indirect  health 
effects.  This  indicates  the  importance  of  the  efficiency  of  the  health  sector  in 
producing healthy people (workers), which may well differ across countries.    51 
Although we have assumed a balanced government budget in which state benefits 
adjust, the overall welfare gains allow for compensation of welfare losses of non-
working households and in particular pensioners (and UK doctors and nurses if their 
wages are not protected) should they arise. 
The foregoing results do not imply that migration is also a desirable policy given that 
many  migrant  workers  come  from  developing  countries  which  need  their  own 
educated staff. Another paper will tackle this issue in more detail. Moreover, one may 
argue that in the long-term, the only sustainable policy which addresses the root cause 
of the shortage of medical personnel is to increase the number of medical school 
places in the UK.  
Directions for future research should focus on increasing the level of disaggregation 
in health care in terms of, for example, types of treatments and care (which differ in 
effectiveness)  and  in  terms  of  types  of  health  care  staff  (distinguish  managers, 
doctors, nurses and ancillary staff separately) and equipment to allow for differential 
elasticities of substitution between them. With respect to migration, the results may 
differ  if  we  take  into  account  that  domestic  and  migrant  workers  are  (initially) 
imperfect substitutes, the latter earning a lower wage as they start working in the UK.   52 
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Appendix – The UK CGE model: health and welfare effects 
All  sectors  are  perfectly  competitive  and  multi-product  industries.  The  production 
technologies  are  Constant  Returns  to  Scale  (CRTS),  with  production  a  Leontief 
function of intermediates and value-added, itself a Cobb Douglas (CD) function of 
homogeneous  factors  of  production.  Household  preferences  are  homothetic,  with 
utility a CD function of consumption and savings. Cross-border trade is treated using 
the assumption that the UK is a small open economy facing exogenous world prices 
for imports and exports and accommodates ‘entrepôt’ trade, i.e. the re-exporting (re-
importing) of imported (exported) goods and transport and trade margins. In addition, 
the  Armington  assumption  (Armington,  1969)  is  imposed  on  both  production  and 
consumption:  goods  produced  domestically  are  destined  for  either  the  domestic 
market or for the export market, while consumers differentiate between domestic and 
imported varieties of the “same” good. Substitution and transformation elasticities are 
assumed  to  equal  two  in  this  model.
76  The  government  uses  its  revenue  from 
employment, production and  consumption taxes to finance a  fixed  expenditure on 
goods (health care, public administration and defence, and other services) and a fixed 
amount of foreign exchange at the exchange rate to accommodate the trade surplus. 
The remainder of its budget is spent on income transfers to households which adjust 
so  as  to  maintain  the  government  account  balance.  Households  allocate  the  latter 
income  and  earnings  from  the  supply  of  capital,  skilled  and  unskilled  labour  to 
savings and consumption, assuming that only working households save. All factor and 
product markets clear through price  adjustments. Equilibrium in the  capital goods 
market requires that the value of total savings equals the value of total investments. 
With the exchange rate as numéraire and the trade balance fixed in terms of foreign 
exchange, investments are savings-driven so that the model closure is neoclassical.  
Health provision effects 
We model the interaction between health care and effective labour supplies by the use 
of  a  non-participation  rate  for  each  type  of  labour.  Non-participation  can  be 
interpreted as being on the waiting list, whereas participation implies employment in 
                                                 
76   The majority of goods produced in the UK is traded with similar high-income countries and are of the same high quality so 
that substitution and transformation elasticities are reasonably high. At the multi-commodity level elasticity values in GTAP 
version 5 (http://www.gtap.org) are around 2 to 2.5.   61 
one of the sectors of the economy. The effective supply of factor endowments  f  by 
households  h,  hf FE , is specified in equation (A1), and the waiting list for factor  f  
by household h,  hf WL , is displayed in equation (A2).  
  hf hf hf FE F WL =     (A1) 
  hf f hf WL F   =   (A2) 
where  0 1 f   < <   for  labour  types  f l   ,  { } , l Skill Unsk = ;  otherwise  (for  capital) 
0 f   = . The waiting list is a fraction of total given factor endowments of household h 
( hf F ), and is defined positively only for labour ( f l   ) whereas capital is always fully 
effective and fully employed.
77 
The fraction of people on the waiting list, the non-participation rate, is assumed to be 




f l f f HC
     
 
  =   (A3) 
where  0 0 f l     >  is a scale parameter, which measures the effectiveness of a given 
level of health care in treating and/or curing people and is calibrated so that  1 f l     < .
78 
f l HC    is a health composite and  0 f l     >  is the waiting list elasticity, which measures 
the effectiveness of a change in health provisioning in treating and/or curing people. 
The latter is defined as the proportionate change in the size of labour type l ’s waiting 
list  for  household  h  following  a  change  in  the  health  composite, 
( )( ) 0 f l hf f f f WL HC HC WL     =         > . 
The health care composite for labour type l  is a measure of the ‘healthiness’ or health 
status of this labour type and is a CD function of its public and private health care 
consumption:  




f l h h HC G C
     
  =     (A4) 
                                                 
77   This does of course ignore the loss in effective capital when, for instance, machines break down. However, the cost of 
repairing a machine is internal to the firm, and is assumed to be assimilated into the cost of capital services, whereas the 
repair (treatment) of ill workers is a cost to the state or to the worker’s insurers. 
78   Note that  0 f      as 
f HC     , but that the upper constraint for  f    is not automatically satisfied.  0 f l      also measures 
the non-participation rate for  0
f l  
  = . Health care is then completely ineffective (i.e. does not cure people) and therefore 
does not affect waiting lists.   62 
where  0 1 l        denotes the share of public health care in the health status of labour 
type l .  "10" G  denotes health care (commodity “10” in Table 9) provided via the NHS - 
as  given  by  real  government  consumption  of  health  care,  j G -  and  "10"h hC    
represents  the  level  of  private  health  care  provisioning  -  as  given  by  the  sum  of 
household consumptions,  jh C , of health care. 
Given equations (A1) to (A4), waiting lists (effective labour supplies) are decreasing 
(increasing)  in  the  health  composites,  at  a  decreasing  rate.  Figure  A1  illustrates 
(subscripts are ignored for simplicity). 
Figure A1 Waiting lists and effective endowments 
 
The contribution of public health care to the health status of skilled and unskilled 
labour, as measured by   , is obtained from Emmerson et al. (2000). Using Family 
Resource  Survey  data  for  the  period  1994/1995  to  1997/1998,  they  calculate  the 
percentage  of  adults  with  private  medical  insurance  by  social  class.  By  applying 
population weights corresponding to each social class from the GHS, the proportions 
of  skilled  and  unskilled  labour  having  private  medical  insurance  are  estimated  at 
16.6% and 4% respectively, yielding a residual of 83.4% and 96% of skilled and 
unskilled labour for whom health care is financed via the NHS. The latter serve as 
proxies for   .  
The scale parameter  0    is calibrated to the benchmark non-participation rate. Its value 
is based on the Barmby et al. (2002, 2003) measure of sickness absence, calculated as 
the  ratio  of  the  number  of  hours  absent  due  to  sickness  to  the  number  of  hours 
contracted to work. Using Labour Force Survey data, the authors find a fairly stable 
long-run average for the (yearly) sickness absence rate in the UK of around 3.20%. 
   63 
These  and  other  studies
79  find  that  sickness  absence  varies  by  socio-economic 
characteristics. Illness-related absence from work is approximately 1.5 times higher 
for manual than that for non-manual workers. Assuming that the non-participation 
rate in the base year for unskilled workers is 1.5 times that of skilled workers and 
postulating an overall non-participation rate of 3.20% yields  0   = 2.89% for skilled 
and  0   = 4.34% for unskilled workers.  
The waiting list elasticity parameter,   , is set to 2 for both labour types, so that a 10% 
increase in health status leads to a 20% decrease in waiting lists. A value of 2 seems 
reasonable since it gives health elasticities for skilled and unskilled labour of around 
0.1 (0.06 and 0.09 for skilled and unskilled labour respectively), consistent with the 
scant empirical evidence that exists in this area.
80  
Welfare effects 
The effects on welfare of higher health provision are two-fold: it directly increases the 
“well-being” of the population and indirectly improves welfare by increasing the size 
of the effective (i.e. “able to work”) endowments of skilled and unskilled labour for 
use in non-health activities. Accordingly, changes in household welfare are calculated 
from private household utility using the Hicksian equivalent variation, to which the 
benefits from changes in public good provisioning (including NHS care) are added. 













=   (A5) 
where  h U and  h Y  denote household utility and income respectively, and superscript 0 
and 1 respectively refer to the equilibria before and after a particular shock occurs.  
                                                 
79   See for example the Confederation of British Industry (2001) and Barham and Leonard (2002) for an overview. 
80   Folland  et al. (2001, pp.108-109).  These elasticities  measure  the proportionate  change  in the size of effective (labour) 
endowments  of  skilled  and  unskilled  labour  following  a  change  in  the  health  composite,  and  are  calculated  as 
( )( ) ( ) 1 hf f f hf f hf hf f f f FE HC HC FE WL FE             = =   . The elasticity is higher for unskilled labour due to the fact 
that a relatively higher proportion of the unskilled suffer illness, so that health expenditure’s “leverage” is greater for this 
labour type.   64 
Assuming  that  each  household  receives  a  share 
jh G     of  the  change  in  the  real 
government consumption of good  j (where 0 1, 1
jh jh G G
h
        =   ), the overall change 
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    (A6) 
where 
0
j GEXP  denotes benchmark government expenditure on good  j.
81 




EV EV =    (A7) 
Welfare changes related to public good provisioning are allocated to households in 
proportions 
jh G   , which for health care correspond to each household’s share of the 
total number of NHS general practitioner consultations and for other goods (public 
administration  and  defence,  and  other  services  respectively)  correspond  to  each 
household’s  share  in  the  population.  The  resulting  parameter  estimates,  including 
household shares in government transfers,  TRh   , are shown in Table A1. 
Table A1 Household shares in government transfers and public goods 
Parameter 
jh G    
Household 
type 
TRh     Public 
administration and 
defence 
Health care  Other services 
Pensioners  0.523  0.176  0.251  0.176 
Non-working, 
children 
0.102  0.064  0.087  0.064 
Non-working, 
no children 
0.106  0.054  0.076  0.054 
Working, 
children 
0.234  0.370  0.306  0.370 
Working, no 
children 
0.035  0.336  0.280  0.336 
 
                                                 
81   Note that private health care is already included in the utility function and thus in welfare. The current and, for the purpose 
of this analysis, more appropriate welfare specification postulates that an increase in the provision of public health care (and 
other goods) constitutes a direct welfare gain. Also, the resulting overall welfare measure, displayed in equation (A7), is 
equivalent to a social welfare function with equal weights, i.e. a common utilitarian social welfare function (Johansson, 
1991, p.32). 